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MUSCLE MEMORY AND THE LOCAL
CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
LEE KOVARSKY†
ABSTRACT
The modern death penalty is not just concentrating in a handful of
practicing states; it is disappearing in all but a few capitally active
localities. Capital-punishment concentration, however, still surfaces
more as the subject of casual observation than as the object of
sophisticated academic inquiry. Normative and doctrinal analyses of
the phenomenon are virtually nonexistent, in part because the current
ability to measure and report concentration is so limited.
This Article is the first attempt to measure capital-punishment
concentration rigorously, by combining different sources of countylevel data and by borrowing quantitative tools that economists use to
study market competition. The analysis yields three major findings: (1)
capital sentencing is concentrating dramatically; (2) executions are
concentrating more gradually; and (3) both trends persist within most
capitally active states.
Certain normative and doctrinal conclusions follow from the
empirical findings. The causes of concentration are likely to be more
bureaucratic and path dependent than they are democratic and
pragmatic, reflecting what I call the “muscle memory” of local
institutional practice. If local muscle memory indeed explains
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concentration, such concentration violates basic punishment norms
requiring equal treatment of similar offenders. This problem
notwithstanding, existing death penalty jurisprudence does not account
for local concentration. For concentration to have any influence on the
outcome of constitutional inquiry, the Supreme Court would have to
revise its working definition of “arbitrariness.”
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INTRODUCTION
There is an obscure piece of gallows trivia about the death penalty
in Texas. If Harris County seceded and was thereafter annexed as the
fifty-first state, the story goes, then it would immediately become
America’s second-most capitally active state jurisdiction—trailing only
what remained of Texas. The data substantiate the story. Out of the
1437 post-1976 executions carried out in American states, 126 of them
ended the life of an inmate who was capitally sentenced in Harris
County.1 In that same period, Texas put to death 411 inmates sentenced
elsewhere.2 Oklahoma, the next state on the list, executed 112.3
With respect to local irregularities, the execution bulge in Harris
County is just the tip of the iceberg. Consider Caddo Parish, a small
administrative division in northeast Louisiana with a nasty history of
postbellum lynching.4 Caddo found itself the subject of a 2015 media
firestorm when its interim District Attorney (DA), Dale Cox, publicly
declared that the government ought to “kill more people.”5 Cox had
spent years prosecuting capital crimes as Caddo’s first assistant DA,
and his comments followed his anguished predecessor’s mea culpa for
securing the wrongful conviction of Glenn Ford, a black man who was
exonerated after almost thirty years on Louisiana’s death row.6 Cox’s
influence shows just how sensitive capital-sentencing activity can be to
the preferences of a local stakeholder: between 2010 and 2015, when
the Shreveport newspapers published his comments, Cox had
personally secured half of the state’s death verdicts.7

1. See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions [https://perma.cc/LY33-CNBS] (.csv file downloaded on
Sept. 28, 2016).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 65, 84–85 (2012).
5. See Campbell Robertson, The Prosecutor Who Says Louisiana Should ‘Kill More
People,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/louisiana-prosecutorbecomes-blunt-spokesman-for-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/U7NU-GAS6].
6. See Andrew Cohen, Freedom After 30 Years on Death Row, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/freedom-after-30-years-on-death-row/2841
79 [https://perma.cc/GC2S-GRG4]; Andrew Cohen, Glenn Ford, in the End, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/glenn-ford-end [https://perma.
cc/B95X-9CAE].
7. Robert J. Smith, America’s Deadliest Prosecutors, SLATE (May 14, 2015, 3:54 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/america_s_deadliest_pro
secutors_death_penalty_sentences_in_louisiana_florida.htm [https://perma.cc/8V8E-9ZNW].
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There is a widespread belief that to study capital punishment is to
scrutinize the “death belt,”8 a term referring to the southern states
responsible for imposing and carrying out most American capital
sentences. Regional and state aggregation of death penalty data,
however, suppresses information about the concentration of capital
process in smaller political units. Evaluating modern capital
punishment patterns is less about understanding the electoral
complexities of statewide decisionmaking than it is about
understanding the administrative and political idiosyncrasies of
counties, parishes, cities, and townships. The meaningful units of study
are not Texas and Louisiana; they are Harris County and Caddo Parish.
County-level data on death sentences and executions—together,
what I call “capital outcomes”—are an increasingly important source
of information about the death penalty.9 In Glossip v. Gross,10 the
blockbuster capital case from the Supreme Court’s 2015 Term, countylevel data surfaced briefly in Justice Breyer’s dissent charting a course
for categorical challenges to the death penalty.11 Exercising what seems
like a prerogative of the Court’s longer-tenured members, Justice
Breyer confessed a strong constitutional skepticism of capital
punishment.12 The timing and content of Justice Breyer’s dissent invite
comparisons to similar sentiments expressed by Justice Blackmun, who
declared after twenty-four years on the bench that he would “no

8. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth
Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1325 (1997) (noting the absence of reform in the “death belt”
states); Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of
Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV.
283, 307 (1989) (discussing the evolution of capital sentencing law beyond the “death belt”).
9. See generally Meg Beardsley, Sam Kamin, Justin Marceau & Scott Phillips, Disquieting
Discretion: Race, Geography & the Colorado Death Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First
Century, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 431 (2015) (analyzing racial and geographic variables for the
Colorado death penalty); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its
Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2012) (analyzing county-level data on capital sentencing from
2004–2009); James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973–1995, COLUM. L. SCH. (June 12, 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
instructionalservices/liebman/ [https://perma.cc/Y3QB-MXGY] [hereinafter Broken System I]
(compiling county-level data on error rates in death penalty litigation); James S. Liebman, Jeffrey
Fagan, Andrew Gelman, Valerie West, Garth Davies & Alexander Kiss, A Broken System, Part
II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, COLUM. L.
SCH. (Feb. 11, 2002), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html [https://
perma.cc/X2HY-UGWZ] [hereinafter Broken System II] (analyzing data from Broken System I,
supra).
10. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
11. Id. at 2761–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at 2776–77.

KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/27/2016 10:06 AM

CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

263

longer . . . tinker with the machinery of death.”13 Joined by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer argued that the Eighth Amendment likely
forbids a capital-sentencing regime that is arbitrary because, among
other reasons, “within a death penalty State, the imposition of the
death penalty heavily depends on the county in which a defendant is
tried.”14 Citing data from 2004 to 2009, Justice Breyer reported that
nearly half of America’s death sentences are concentrated in less than
1 percent of its counties.15
Justice Breyer’s opinion reveals both the strengths and limits of
existing data on the geographic distribution of capital punishment.
Scholars are increasingly reporting the general conclusion, based on
publicly available data, that both death sentences and executions are
concentrated in a small set of local political units that still impose
capital punishment.16 Such information, however, only scratches the
surface. Simply reporting the number of counties practicing capital
punishment omits several important pieces of information: the
geographic distribution of activity levels, the change in distribution
over time, whether capital punishment practice is concentrating within
states, and how the distribution tracks variables like population and
homicides.
The need to understand concentration over time is particularly
important because that phenomenon coincides with another one—the
steep decline in the number of death sentences and executions. No
scholarship grapples at significant length with how the combination of
rising concentration and declining use implicates the normative
justifications for and doctrinal administration of the death penalty. My
objective here, therefore, is to frame and answer three crucial
questions about the geographic distribution of capital outcomes: How
much is concentration really increasing, what is the normative
significance of that phenomenon, and what are its implications under
existing doctrine? The precise constitutional device by which courts
will incorporate information about local concentration is unclear, but
Glossip signals rather unmistakably that a contingent of Justices thinks
it should be moving in that direction.

13. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, supra note 9, at 231–32).
15. Id. (citing Smith, supra note 9, at 233).
16. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 231–46 (breaking out capital sentence and execution data
by county for the period from 2004–2009).
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In Part I, I focus on the data, which disclose concentration of
capital outcomes in a handful of localities. I use the term
“concentration” to refer to an uneven geographic distribution of
capital punishment activity within a political unit. If “intensity” refers
to a given locality’s level of capital activity, then concentrated political
units will have some high-intensity localities amidst many low-intensity
ones. Although simple counting instruments have suggested some
increased concentration, there has been virtually no development of
metrics precisely quantifying the degree of concentration—metrics
that would permit apples-to-apples comparisons across political units
and time periods. Using new data and borrowing methodology used to
flag anticompetitive conditions in economic markets, I develop three
such metrics. Each metric I develop has individual shortcomings, but
collectively they tell a consistent story. Over the last twenty years, there
have been dramatic increases in the geographic concentration of death
sentences, and moderate increases in the concentration of executions.17
These effects are evident both nationally and—perhaps more
importantly—within the most capitally active state jurisdictions.
In Part II, I explore the normative significance of capital-outcome
concentration, based on its plausible causes. High concentration levels
do not correspond to population density or to the distribution of
homicides, and are not substantially attributable to locally
differentiated punishment norms. Instead, extreme capital-outcome
concentration is likely the result of what I call “local muscle memory,”
by which I mean correlated decisionmaking across multiple sites of
local discretion. Correlated decisionmaking, in turn, refers to the idea
that local actors influencing capital-sentencing outcomes exercise
discretion in an environment that tends to produce momentum in favor
of or against sustained capital activity. Local muscle memory produces
a separating equilibrium for death penalties and executions: a few
capitally active localities, and many more that tend towards abstention.
In light of muscle memory, I evaluate the normative significance of
capital-outcome concentration under consequentialist and retributivist
accounts of the death penalty. If certain localities are cost-effective
capital punishment “specialists,” then concentration might have a
weak consequentialist justification; but such geographic distribution
almost certainly violates retributivist constraints on punishment. That
violation persists even under justificatory theory allowing localities to
treat similar offenses differently.
17. See infra Part I.B
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In Part III, I explain why, notwithstanding the considerable
normative complications that it presents, capital-outcome
concentration is unlikely to affect the constitutionality of the death
penalty under existing jurisprudence. Of course, not every flaw in state
criminal-justice administration corresponds with a corrective feature of
positive law. Nevertheless, the doctrinal insensitivity to concentration
is puzzling, as irregular punishment practice was an animating principle
for modern death penalty law.18 If the Supreme Court is inclined to
accommodate its death penalty doctrine to the reality of increasing
capital-outcome concentration, then it needs to change its working
definition of “arbitrariness.” More precisely, it would have to expand
the definition to include not just capital-outcome patterns that are
insufficiently sensitive to variables that should influence results, but
also patterns that are too sensitive to variables that should not.
I. DATA ON CAPITAL OUTCOMES
Although the legal community is generally aware that capital
outcomes cluster geographically, that awareness remains quite limited
in two respects. First, there are no established metrics for measuring
capital-outcome concentration. Second, and partially because there are
no such metrics, variation over time and across jurisdictions remains a
mystery. In order to address both issues, I treat capital outcomes like a
market. Death sentences and executions are the output, and counties
are the firms. Using this framework, I can compute national and stateby-state capital-outcome concentration values for any period of time.
In recognition that no single value can convey all necessary
information about capital-outcome concentration, I have developed
three metrics: (1) a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), (2) an eightcounty concentration ratio (CR8), and (3) a “half-of-outcome index”
(HOI). The HHI is the primary index of concentration, and the CR8
and HOI are auxiliary indices that provide important pieces of
information that the HHI omits. I compute these three values for each
of four five-year periods between 1996 and 2015. I present detailed
results in Part I.B, but there are three top-line findings: the
concentration of death sentences is increasing very quickly, the
concentration of executions is increasing more slowly, and both effects
persist even within the most capitally active states.

18. See infra Part III.A.2.
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A. Data and Method
The “modern” American death penalty era began on July 2, 1976,
when—after having invalidated all existing death penalty laws in
Furman v. Georgia19—the Supreme Court decided five cases specifying
the constitutional parameters for capital-sentencing statutes.20 For
death sentences and executions, I compute separate concentration
indices spanning the last twenty years of the modern era, from 1996 to
2015. To obtain and evaluate my results, I analyzed four different
datasets: decennial census data for 2000 and 2010;21 a new set of countylevel death-sentencing data from 1996 to 2015;22 publicly available
county-level execution data from 1996 to 2015;23 and county-level

19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). These cases are referred to as the “July 2 cases.”
21. This dataset comes from the United States Census Bureau. See USA Counties Data File
Downloads, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.
html#POP [https://perma.cc/NG3R-HQK4].
22. These data were collected and compiled by Professor Brandon L. Garrett and are on file
with the Duke Law Journal. As a starting point, Garrett used 1977–2013 data from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS), computing the number of capital sentences in each state and using that
number as a baseline “target” for independent corroboration. See Publications and Products:
Capital Punishment, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbtp&tid
=18&iid=1 [https://perma.cc/HEA6-YDA3] (collecting BJS reports by year). Garrett then
adjusted the targets based on verification and additional research. For the purposes of verifying
the targets, Garrett obtained additional county-level data from the Eighth Amendment Project.
Garrett reconciled the Eighth Amendment data with BJS data for the available years. Garrett
then collected 2015 data and checked it against the dataset being generated by the Eighth
Amendment Project.
To determine the county-level sentencing activity to be checked against the targets,
Garrett worked from lists of death row inmates from the “Death Row USA” quarterly reports
(which were biannual in the 1990s) published by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
(LDF). The Death Row USA reports contained the names of all death row inmates, obtained
from state and federal departments of corrections. See Death Row USA, NAACP LEGAL DEF. &
EDUC. FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/death-row-usa [https://perma.cc/DLX9-S3QA]. New
names appearing on the NAACP LDF reports were assumed to be new sentences. Garrett crosschecked the list generated from the NAACP LDF reports against those generated by capital
postconviction centers in California, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia.
After obtaining the list of new death row inmates, Garrett used Westlaw, state departments of
corrections records, and news reports to determine the county in which the sentence was imposed.
The counts per state and per year almost always exceeded the BJS counts, indicating that the
results were more complete than the published BJS data. A defendant sentenced to death more
than once—because the first sentence was overturned—will show up as two observations.
23. This dataset comes from the Death Penalty Information Center. See DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., supra note 1.
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homicide data from 1999 to 2014.24 I focus only on state outcomes
because the federal death penalty is extremely rare and considerably
more centralized; it is neither conceptually nor empirically suitable for
the analysis I perform here. I therefore excised forty-nine federal death
sentences and three federal executions from the sentencing and
execution datasets, respectively.25 I ended up with 3218 sentencing
observations and 1106 execution observations. When I associate an
execution observation with a county, I simply mean that the executed
offender was convicted and capitally sentenced there.
In order to study change over time, I assigned each entry in the
sentencing and execution data to one of four periods: 1996 to 2000
(period 1), 2001 to 2005 (period 2), 2006 to 2010 (period 3), or 2011 to
2015 (period 4). Using census data, I associated a population value with
each county, for each time period. I used a county’s 2000 census value
to estimate its population for periods 1 and 2, and the 2010 census value
for periods 3 and 4. For each period, I was able to associate fractions
of populations, death sentences, and executions with every county in
the United States. County-level census data are a major part of the
HOI computations, but I also use it periodically to evaluate the
influence of population in other circumstances. Similarly, I use the
county-level homicide data to explore, where necessary, the
relationship between capital outcomes and culpable murders.
1. Metric Construction. The methodological challenge is how to
construct concentration metrics for larger political units—for example,
a state or a country. A useful metric should be sensitive to at least two
things: (1) the “evenness” of capital-outcome distribution across
counties;26 and (2) the number of counties accounting for a capital
sentence or an execution.27 There is higher evenness when each of n

24. This dataset comes from the Center for Disease Control (CDC), which keeps homicide
statistics based on information in death certificates. See About Underlying Cause of Death, 1999–
2014, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html [https://perma.cc/
VQ4C-N9E9] [hereinafter CDC Data] (in category six, first select “Injury Intent and
Mechanism,” and then select “Homicide” as the option for “Injury Intent”).
25. For both sentences and executions, I took out observations associated with an Article III
court or with a military tribunal.
26. By “evenness,” I simply mean the degree to which the geographic distribution of
punishment within a particular political unit deviates from a distribution across n counties in
which each county accounts for 1/n percent of the political unit’s capital activity.
27. In other contexts, the number of categories is referred to as “richness.” See, e.g., Jim
Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 495, 553 (2004) (using this term in the biodiversity context).
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counties’ share of capital events approaches 1/n. The lowconcentration bound of a metric should correspond with perfectly even
distribution across numerous counties; the high-concentration bound
should correspond with a perfectly uneven distribution in which all
capital punishment activity occurs in a single county. If values are
computed for each period, then the results show the change in capitalevent concentration over time.
In other disciplines, metrics called “diversity indices” are
sometimes used to measure concentration in the way that I
contemplate here. A diversity index is constructed from a dataset that
contains a distribution of units across categories. More categories and
greater evenness should push the index toward one extreme; fewer
categories and less evenness should push the index toward the other.
Ecologists use one such index to measure biodiversity in communities
of animals distributed across different species.28 Information theorists
rely on a diversity index to measure information content in bits
distributed across alphanumeric characters.29 Economists use yet
another diversity index to measure inequality in the distribution of
wealth across people.30
Although I construct three metrics to measure concentration, I
rely most heavily on the HHI, a diversity index familiar to economists
measuring industrial concentration.31 The HHI captures how outputs
(units) are distributed across firms (categories). HHI is computed as a
sum of squares of the fraction of each locality’s share of a particular
capital punishment outcome:
n
HHI =
o2
j =1



where n is the number of jurisdictions in which capital outcomes occur
and o is the share of capital outcomes occurring in the jth jurisdiction.

28. “Simpson’s Diversity Index” is frequently used to quantify the biodiversity of a biotic
community. For further explanation, see generally E.H. Simpson, Measurement of Diversity, 163
NATURE 688 (1949).
29. “Shannon’s H” is the most famous such index. See CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN
WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949); Claude E. Shannon, A
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948).
30. The “Gini Coefficient” is a diversity index often used to capture income inequality
numerically. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 993, 998 n.21 (2004).
31. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN
TRADE 159–60 (1945); Orris Clemens Herfindahl, Concentration in the Steel Industry 8–9 (1950)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia University
Library).
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Depending on the capital outcome for which I am indexing
concentration, the units of output are either capital sentences or
executions. The firms are either counties or states. To phrase my
approach analogically, I use a diversity index to track the concentration
of capital outcomes like an antitrust regulator would use it to track
market power.
The index approaches 1/(number of firms) as the number of firms
increases and as the distribution of output across firms becomes more
even. Take two examples:
Example 1: ten firms with 10 percent of market share each.
Example 2: ten firms, with one firm having 91 percent market share
and nine firms having 1 percent market share each.

The HHI in Example 1 is 10 x (.1)2 = .1 because it is the sum of squares
for ten firms, each with a 10 percent market share. The HHI in
Example 2 is (.91)2 + 9(.01)2 = .829 because it is the sum of the squares
for one firm with 91 percent of the market and for nine other firms
having 1 percent of the market each. As the examples demonstrate, a
lower HHI generally indicates lower market concentration and
corresponds with a lower risk of anticompetitive activity.32
When computing HHI values for capital outcomes, a county’s
“market share” is the number of capital outcomes in that county
divided by the sum of such outcomes across all counties that are part
of the political unit for which the HHI is being computed—in my
analysis, either a state or the country. Imagine that there were one
hundred executions nationally for a particular time period, spread
equally across ten counties. The HHI (execution) value would be .1,
following the same logic as Example 1 above. Now imagine that, over
the same period, there were one hundred death sentences imposed
nationally across ten counties, but that ninety-one of them were in the
most active county and that there was one death sentence in each of
the remaining nine counties. The HHI (sentence) value would be .829,
following the same logic as Example 2 above.
I also present two auxiliary metrics to measure capital-outcome
concentration. First, I compute a “CR8” concentration ratio. Before
they were displaced by HHI, economists studying mergers used to rely
heavily on concentration ratios to analyze the distribution of power in
32. The Department of Justice started using the HHI to analyze mergers in 1982. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES 12–15 (1982), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G35-T2NH].
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a market.33 A CR(n) concentration ratio is computed using market
shares for the largest n firms, so a CR8 concentration ratio reports a
value for the eight largest industry participants. Perfectly competitive
markets will have CR(n) values approaching 0, and monopolistic or
highly oligopolistic markets will have CR(n) values approaching 1. A
CR8 value for a particular capital outcome would be the fraction of
capital outcomes attributable to the eight most active counties. If one
hundred executions were dispersed equally across ten counties, then
the CR8 (execution) value would be .8, the sum of eight counties with
10 percent shares. If there were one hundred death sentences
nationally, if ninety-one of them were in one county, and if each of the
remaining nine were each from a different county, then the CR8
(sentence) value would be .98—one county with 91 percent of the
market and seven counties with 1 percent each.
Second, I compute what I call an HOI, which refers to the fraction
of the population accounting for half of a political unit’s capital
outcomes. For example, assume that the country has executed 500
offenders in a given period. Starting with the most capitally active
county, an HOI computation requires that the number of executions
from the next-most-active counties be added until the sum reaches
250—half of the country’s 500 executions. The final step in the HOI
computation is to determine the fraction of the U.S. population living
in the counties necessary to reach the 250-outcome threshold.34
When there is an increased concentration of capital outcomes in a
political unit, the HHI and CR8 go up, and the HOI goes down. The
HHI is the best index of concentration, because it measures both the
evenness of a distribution and the number of counties across which
capital outcomes are distributed. Notwithstanding their substantial
weaknesses (detailed below), the auxiliary indices provide additional
information that the HHI does not. The CR8 provides information
about whether the most capitally active counties are driving the change
in concentration, and the HOI tracks concentration in terms of the
fraction of the population that practices the death penalty.

33. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494 n.5 (1974) (relying on
CR2, CR4, and CR10 values); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966)
(White, J., concurring) (relying on CR4, CR8, and CR12 values). In 1982, the Department of
Justice ended the formal use of concentration ratios by excising them from its Merger Guidelines.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 32.
34. If reaching the 50 percent mark requires only a fraction of a county, then I only added
that fraction of the county’s population to the sum that determines HOI.
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2. Methodological Objections and Explanatory Limitations. HHI
is, naturally, an imperfect metric. There are certain theoretical
objections that I do not address in depth here. Some have argued, for
example, that HHI might be too sensitive to changes in evenness,35 and
others have argued that it might be too sensitive to changes in the
number of categories.36 Perhaps the most established criticism of HHI
is that it is insufficiently sensitive to changes at extremely high and low
levels of concentration—that it is incapable of achieving precision near
its maximum and minimum values.37
The other concerns about HHI are less methodological objections
than they are explanatory limitations. The biggest explanatory limit is
that HHI discloses nothing about what is causing changes in the index
value. Many different phenomena could produce similar changes to the
bottom-line index, and the normative implications of those changes
might differ accordingly. None of the metrics I present is capable of
showing correlation in the way, for example, a multivariate regression
analysis might demonstrate that homicide rates among certain
subpopulations predict capital punishment activity.38 By computing
CR8 and HHI, however, I have made a modest effort to present the
degree to which the concentration of capital outcomes is tracking
population.
Another explanatory limit involves the effect of observations
where n = 0; that is, when a state or county either has no death
sentences or no executions. Conceptually, if there are five capitally
active counties, that capital activity should correspond with different
concentration depending on whether that state also contains five
capitally inactive counties, or fifty. The HHI, however, will be the same
in both circumstances. This issue would not affect longitudinal analysis
within a state, but it might complicate comparisons between states. To

35. See, e.g., Michael O. Finkelstein & Richard M. Friedberg, The Application of an Entropy
Theory of Concentration to the Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J. 677, 706 (1967) (calling this objection
the “small firm problem”).
36. See, e.g., David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, Twenty Years of Merger
Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 283 (2003)
(“[T]he HHI probably overemphasizes the potential competitive impact of the purchase of a
competitor with a very small share by a competitor with a larger share . . . .”).
37. See Amber E. Boydstun, Shaun Bevan & Herschel F. Thomas III, The Importance of
Attention Diversity and How to Measure It, 42 POL’Y STUD. J. 173, 181 (2014).
38. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An
Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 356–57 (2005). Another example is that concentration
might be desirable if the concentration is occurring in jurisdictions with the highest concentration
of capital murder.
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address this issue in this Article, I report the fraction of counties that
are capitally active within each state, and I report HOI values that are
more conducive to interstate comparison.39
A final explanatory concern about HHI—in fact, about any metric
I could report—is that there is no objectively verifiable way to test
whether capital outcomes are “too concentrated.” In a market context,
economists can observe whether a change in HHI produces market
structure conducive to supracompetitive pricing. In a capital
punishment context, however, there is no real-world behavior that
discloses whether the HHI is appropriately signaling concentration.
The appropriate distribution of capital outcomes is a purely normative
question. I direct considerable effort to that question in Part II,
although the answer will never involve a magic number.
The auxiliary indices have some strengths, but also obvious
limitations. The CR8 maps more intuitively onto things one might say
about capital outcomes in the real world. If the CR8 goes from .45 to
.55, the eight busiest counties are accounting for an additional ten
percentage points of a capital outcome. The CR8, however, discloses
nothing about capital-outcome concentration across the eight most
active counties or across the remaining ones—even though the
concentration of activity within each group might be extremely
important. Moreover, selecting eight counties is arbitrary.40 Eight is not
inherently superior to six or to ten, but I chose that number because it
is neither too big nor too small to differentiate meaningfully between
the various political units that I am analyzing. The HOI provides per
capita information that neither the HHI nor the CR8 contains, but it
also amplifies the worst features of the CR8. It reveals nothing about
the distribution of capital outcomes across the counties that account
for 50 percent of events, and it reveals nothing about the distribution
of capital outcomes across the rest.
HHI is just one piece of a larger diagnostic puzzle. To be too harsh
on it because it fails to capture every nuance of the underlying data is

39. For very granular comparison between different state jurisdictions, there are quantitative
techniques available to further eliminate the “n = 0” problem. For instance, a “Gini Index” is a
widespread metric used to compare levels of income inequality between different countries. See
Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 24 n.6 (2010).
Generally speaking, the Gini Index measures deviation from a perfectly even distribution of
income. A synthetic Gini Index could be constructed for capital outcomes by assigning a fraction
of each capital outcome to every person in each county, and computing the “inequality.”
40. Cf. Finkelstein & Friedberg, supra note 35, at 680 (leveling arbitrariness criticism at the
practice of using concentration ratios for merger analysis).
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to miss the point of an index. Even without the auxiliary indices, the
HHI would provide meaningful information about the national
concentration of death sentences and executions. Because the auxiliary
indices do disclose some of the information that HHI does not, the
three metrics collectively reveal information that an HHI-only analysis
might have missed.
B. Results
In Tables 1 through 8, I present the most noteworthy results of my
analysis. Table 1 shows national HHI values by period, for both death
sentences and executions. The HHI values for death sentences increase
each period, which signals growing concentration. The HHI values for
executions similarly increase each period, except between periods 3
and 4, where there appears to be some corrective dispersion in
response to substantially increased concentration between periods 2
and 3.41
I have also listed the number of states and counties that sentenced
an offender to death in the pertinent periods. The number of counties
with death sentences fell in each period (509, 330, 268, 183), as did the
number of counties with executions (200, 178, 128, 106). In period 1,
16.2 percent of American counties imposed a death sentence; by period
4, that figure sat at 5.8 percent. In period 1, 6.4 percent of American
counties sentenced someone who was actually executed; by period 4,
only 3.4 percent of American counties did. Those numbers mirror
considerable concentration in state-level capital punishment practice,
both for death sentences and executions.

41. By “corrective dispersion,” I simply mean a regression to a less severely sloped trend
line.
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Table 1: HHI Values for Death Sentences and Executions (National)
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2015

Death Sentences

(n = 1421)

(n = 772)

(n = 637)

(n = 388)

Counties with a Death
Sentence

509 (16.2%)

330 (10.5%)

268 (8.5%)

183 (5.8%)

36

34

31

26

.0080

.0099

.0140

.0175

(n = 370)

(n = 318)

(n = 230)

(n = 188)

200 (6.4%)

178 (5.7%)

128 (4.1%)

106 (3.4%)

28

21

22

14

.0122

.0183

.0307

.0192

States with a Death
Sentence
HHI
Executions
Counties with an
Execution
States with an
Execution
HHI

Table 2 shows national CR8 values by period. The CR8 values
behave the same way that the HHI values do. For death sentences, they
increase every period; for executions, they do the same, except
between periods 3 and 4. As is the case with HHI, however, the CR8
value for executions in period 4 still shows more concentration than
does the value in period 2. Table 2 also includes the fraction of the
national population housed in the eight most capitally active counties.
These values were relatively stable over time for both death sentences
and executions, with a slight decrease for death sentences and slight
increase for executions. (As I will explain later, that stability likely
reflects the largely stable composition of capitally active counties.)
Table 2: CR8 Values for Death Sentences and Executions (National)
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2015

(n = 1421)

(n = 772)

(n = 637)

(n = 388)

CR8 Values

17.66%

21.24%

25.12%

29.64%

Fraction of Population
in CR8 Counties

9.88%

8.26%

7.46%

8.47%

Executions

(n = 370)

(n = 318)

(n = 230)

(n = 188)

CR8 Values

22.43%

27.99%

33.91%

29.26%

Fraction of Population
in CR8 Counties

3.77%

3.41%

3.83%

4.79%

Death Sentences
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Table 3 contains national HOI values by period. The HOI falls in
every period for death sentences; for executions, it conforms to the
more general pattern of concentration followed by abrupt dispersion
in period 4. Worth noting, however, is that the number of counties
generating 50 percent of the executions does in fact decrease over
every period in the data. Generally speaking and over time, a shrinking
fraction of the American population has become responsible for a
larger fraction of both death sentences and executions.
Table 3: HOI Percent Values for Death Sentences and Executions
(National)
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2015

(n = 1421)

(n = 772)

(n = 637)

(n = 388)

59.70

47.25

36.13

28.33

23.68%

20.75%

17.07%

13.53%

Executions

(n = 370)

(n = 318)

(n = 230)

(n = 188)

Counties Containing
50 Percent of
Executions (Fractional
for Final County)

38.50

32.50

24.00

22.00

Percentage of U.S.
Population

7.79%

6.02%

5.00%

8.07%

Death Sentences
Counties Containing
50 Percent of Death
Sentences (Fractional
for Final County)
Percentage of U.S.
Population

Table 4 is a state-level detail of the five states with the most death
sentences: California, Texas, Florida, Alabama, and North Carolina.
Between periods 1 and 4, each state experienced heightened
concentration. Increases in California, Alabama, and North Carolina
were substantial. The increases in Texas and Florida were more
moderate, with the CR8 value for Florida actually showing a bit of
dispersion over the period the dataset covers. The values for the
concentration metrics at the state level were considerably more volatile
than they were at the national level. The state with the most substantial
change was North Carolina, which went from being a heavy sentencer
during period 1 to having only seven death sentences in seven different
counties during period 4.
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Table 4: All Values for Death Sentences (State-Level)
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2015

(n = 187)

(n = 98)

(n = 121)

(n = 78)

24 (41.4%)

22 (37.9%)

22 (37.9%)

14 (24.1%)

HHI

.1526

.1160

.1543

.2173

CR8

81.28%

76.53%

83.47%

91.03%

HOI

35.98%

40.53%

33.68%

29.68%

(n = 197)

(n = 138)

(n = 69)

(n = 44)

53 (20.9%)

34 (13.4%)

28 (11.0%)

18 (7.1%)

HHI

.1101

.1181

.0737

.1198

CR8

64.97%

72.46%

62.32%

72.73%

HOI

36.23%

33.63%

41.26%

32.89%

(n = 133)

(n = 73)

(n = 89)

(n = 77)

32 (47.8%)

26 (38.8%)

30 (44.8%)

34 (50.7%)

HHI

.0540

.0512

.0653

.0585

CR8

56.39%

53.42%

57.30%

53.25%

HOI

47.37%

42.82%

25.30%

33.63%

(n = 83)

(n = 47)

(n = 56)

(n = 32)

28 (41.8%)

21 (31.3%)

24 (35.8%)

17 (25.4%)

HHI

.0666

.0928

.0931

.1074

CR8

60.24%

70.21%

64.29%

71.88%

HOI

34.83%

20.97%

26.73%

26.31%

(n = 109)

(n = 37)

(n = 16)

(n = 7)

39 (39.0%)

26 (26.0%)

14 (14.0%)

7 (7.0%)

HHI

.0437

.0533

.0859

.1429

CR8

47.71%

51.35%

62.50%

100.00%

HOI

29.57%

10.96%

22.14%

5.16%

California (n = 483)
Counties with Death
Sentences

Texas (n = 448)
Counties with Death
Sentences

Florida (n = 372)
Counties with Death
Sentences

Alabama (n = 218)
Counties with Death
Sentences

North Carolina
(n = 169)
Counties with Death
Sentences
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Table 5 presents, for executions, the same state-level information
as in Table 4. There is concentration evident in every state except
Florida, which shows increased dispersion across every metric. As with
capital sentencing, the period-to-period volatility of execution
concentration is greater at the state level than it is at the national one.
Texas accounts for almost 40 percent of American executions, so the
substantial concentration there is particularly significant nationally.
Virginia is to executions what North Carolina is to capital sentences: it
went from having reasonably dispersed executions in period 1 to
having only three executions in three different counties during period
4.
Table 5: All Values for Executions (State-Level)
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2015

(n = 135)

(n = 116)

(n = 109)

(n = 67)

57 (22.4%)

43 (16.9%)

35 (13.8%)

27 (10.6%)

HHI

.0573

.0663

.1206

.0916

CR8

53.33%

56.03%

69.72%

68.65%

HOI

42.56%

38.98%

31.66%

35.21%

(n = 24)

(n = 49)

(n = 15)

(n = 18)

14 (18.2%)

15 (19.5%)

11 (14.3%)

9 (13.0%)

HHI

.1528

.2886

.1111

.1852

CR8

75.00%

85.71%

80.00%

94.44%

HOI

36.47%

18.76%

36.72%

31.41%

(n = 52)

(n = 13)

(n = 14)

(n = 3)

27 (19.9%)

13 (9.6%)

12 (8.9%)

3 (2.2%)

HHI

.0562

.0769

.1020

.3333

CR8

59.62%

61.54%

71.43%

100.00%

HOI

16.35%

3.79%

10.41%

0.43%

Texas (n = 427)
Counties with Executions

Oklahoma (n = 112)
Counties with Executions

Virginia (n = 82)
Counties with Executions
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(n = 29)

(n = 20)

(n = 1)

(n = 19)

14 (12.2%)

11 (9.6%)

1 (.9%)

10 (8.7%)

HHI

.1153

.1750

1.000

.1468

CR8

79.31%

85.00%

100.00%

89.47%

HOI

28.34%

18.89%

28.00%

28.33%

(n = 14)

(n = 10)

(n = 9)

(n = 22)

10 (14.9%)

10 (14.9%)

9 (13.4%)

14 (20.9%)

HHI

.1224

.1000

.1111

.0992

CR8

85.71%

80.00%

88.89%

72.73%

HOI

8.00%

5.70%

6.73%

25.04%

Missouri (n = 69)
Counties with Executions

Florida (n = 55)
Counties with Executions

Table 6 is a county-level detail for capital sentencing. Because
there are no subunits capable of generating values for HHI, CR8, or
HOI, I simply provide, by period, the activity level of each of the ten
counties with the most death sentences. Los Angeles County is far and
away the leading producer of capital sentences, and was the leader for
three of the four periods. All of the active death sentencing counties
are extremely populous, with the exception of Oklahoma County,
Oklahoma and Duval County, Florida. Consistent with the national
trend, executions are decreasing in almost every featured county. And,
consistent with the data reported in the previous tables, the outlier is
in Florida—Duval County executed a nontrivially greater number of
people during periods 3 and 4 than it did during periods 1 and 2.
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Table 6: Activity Level of Each of the Ten Counties with the Most
Death Sentences (County-Level)
County Rankings by U.S. Population
Ten Counties with
the Most Death
Sentences

Largest City in
Each County
(2010)

1996–
2000

2001–
2005

2006–
2010

2011–
2015

1st
(L.A.)

1st
(n = 62)

2nd
(n = 26)

1st
(n = 38)

1st
(n = 26)

Harris, TX
(n = 117)

3rd
(Houston)

2nd
(n = 56)

1st
(n = 38)

t-7th
(n = 11)

5th
(n = 12)

Maricopa, AZ
(n = 96)

4th
(Phoenix)

11th
(n = 15)

3rd
(n = 25)

2nd
(n = 38)

3rd
(n = 18)

Riverside, CA
(n = 80)

11th
(Riverside)

4th
(n = 24)

t-7th
(n = 13)

3rd
(n = 20)

2nd
(n = 23)

9th
(Dallas)

8th
(n = 21)

t-5th
(n = 16)

t-10th
(n = 9)

t-5th
(n = 6)

Oklahoma, OK
(n = 50)

80th
(Okla. City)

t-9th
(n = 18)

4th
(n = 18)

t-7th
(n = 11)

t-20th
(n = 3)

Clark, NV
(n = 49)

14th
(Las Vegas)

t-6th
(n = 22)

t-12th
(n = 9)

t-7th
(n = 11)

t-5th
(n = 7)

Orange, CA
(n = 48)

6th
(Anaheim)

t-6th
(n = 19)

t-14th
(n = 7)

5th
(n = 14)

t-6th
(n = 8)

59th
(Jacksonville)

18th
(n = 13)

t-18th
(n = 7)

4th
(n = 15)

4th
(n = 13)

21st
(Phila.)

3rd
(n = 27)

t-9th
(n = 9)

t-19th
(n = 6)

t-34th
(n = 2)

Los Angeles, CA
(n = 152)

Dallas, TX
(n = 52)

Duval, FL
(n = 48)
Philadelphia, PA
(n = 44)

Table 7 presents for executions the same information that Table 6
presented for death sentences. (Because of ties, there are actually
twelve entries in the table.) More executed offenders were sentenced
in Harris County, Texas than in any other local jurisdiction. Seven of
the top twelve producers of executions are from Texas. Unlike capital
sentences, however, executions do not cluster exclusively in populous
counties. Half of the twelve aforementioned counties are not in the top
forty counties nationally, by 2010 population. The national slowdown
is not as universal across the capitally active localities, however, as only
Harris and Tarrant Counties (both in Texas) had dropped more than
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50 percent between periods 1 and 4. Oklahoma County was the most
volatile, dropping from twenty-five executions in period 2 to two
executions in period 3. Harris, Dallas, Oklahoma, and Maricopa are
the only counties appearing in both Table 6 and Table 7.
Table 7: Activity Level of Each of the Ten Counties with the Most
Executions (County-Level)
County Rankings by U.S. Population
Largest City in
Each County
(2010)

1996–
2000

2001–
2005

2006–
2010

2011–
2015

Harris, TX
(n = 85)

3rd
(Houston)

1st
(n = 21)

2nd
(n = 23)

1st
(n = 31)

t-2nd
(n = 10)

Dallas, TX
(n = 47)

9th
(Dallas)

3rd
(n = 13)

3rd
(n = 9)

2nd
(n = 13)

1st
(n = 12)

Oklahoma, OK
(n = 40)

80th
(Okla. City)

4th
(n = 8)

1st
(n = 25)

t-13th
(n = 2)

t-4th
(n = 5)

Tarrant, TX
(n = 34)

15th
(Fort Worth)

2nd
(n = 15)

t-6th
(n = 6)

4th
(n = 9)

t-7th
(n = 4)

Bexar, TX
(n = 33)

18th
(San Antonio)

t-5th
(n = 7)

t-12th
(n = 4)

3rd
(n = 12)

t-2nd
(n = 10)

40th
(Clayton)

t-14th
(n = 4)

t-4th
(n = 7)

N/A
(n = 0)

t-4th
(n = 5)

100+
(Tulsa)

t-22nd
(n = 3)

t-9th
(n = 5)

t-6th
(n = 3)

t-4th
(n = 5)

100+
(Conroe)

t-22nd
(n = 3)

t-4th
(n = 7)

t-36th
(n = 1)

t-18th
(n = 2)

100+
(Tyler)

t-14th
(n = 4)

t-14th
(n = 3)

t-13th
(n = 2)

t-11th
(n = 3)

100+
(Corpus Christi)

t-32nd
(n = 2)

t-6th
(n = 6)

N/A
(n = 0)

t-11th
(n = 3)

Pima, AZ
(n = 11)

42nd
(Tucson)

t-5th
(n = 7)

N/A
(n = 0)

N/A
(n = 0)

t-7th
(n = 4)

Maricopa, AZ
(n = 11)

4th
(Phoenix)

t-9th
(n = 5)

N/A
(n = 0)

t-13th
(n = 2)

t-7th
(n = 4)

Ten Counties with
the Most Executions

St. Louis, MO
(n = 16)
Tulsa, OK
(n = 16)
Montgomery, TX
(n = 13)
Smith, TX
(n = 12)
Nueces, TX
(n = 11)
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Finally, Table 8 uses Center for Disease Control (CDC) data to
show, both nationally and for select state jurisdictions, a relationship
between the distribution of capital sentences and homicides.42
Specifically, I computed each county’s fraction of national and state
homicides, and associated that information with capital-sentencing
data. For example, during period 1, counties responsible for half of
American capital sentences also accounted for 36.2 percent of its
intentional homicides. By period 4, the counties responsible for half of
capital sentencing covered only 18.7 percent of the country’s
intentional homicides. The period 4 value is smaller than the period 1
value in every jurisdiction, with the change nationally being more
dramatic than what is observed in most individual states.
Table 8: Fraction of Homicides that Account for Half of the Capital
Sentences, Within Select Jurisdictions (National and State-Level)
1996–2000

2001–2005

2006–2010

2011–2016

United States

36.2%

31.1%

24.5%

18.7%

California

45.1%

49.2%

44.4%

41.8%

Texas

53.5%

51.0%

58.1%

49.2%

Florida

49.0%

27.6%

22.4%

36.4%

Alabama

50.8%

29.3%

42.4%

34.8%

North Carolina

31.4%

13.7%

15.9%

3.8%

C. Preliminary Observations
The data show that the concentration of capital sentences is
increasing precipitously.43 The concentration of executions is
increasing unambiguously but more slowly, with different metrics
showing some dispersion in periods 3 and 4.44 There is considerable
information residing in the concentration index values for individual
states, too. Those values strongly suggest that increasing national
concentration is not simply happening because fewer states retain
capital punishment, but because such practice is concentrating even

42. See CDC Data, supra note 24.
43. See supra Tables 1–3.
44. See supra Tables 1–3.

KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

282

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/27/2016 10:06 AM

[Vol. 66:259

within retentionist states.45 They also show that, within individual
states, execution concentration is happening more slowly than
sentencing concentration. Florida, however, stands out as the major
source of data that are inconsistent with the global trends, showing a
considerably more jagged trendline for both capital sentences and
executions.
1. Capital Sentences. As the number of capital sentences fell in
periods 1 through 4, the practice also became considerably more
concentrated. The number of counties with death sentences fell from
509 to 183, and the number of states with death sentences fell from
thirty-six to twenty-six.46 At the same time, the national HHI (counties)
more than doubled, from .0080 to .0175.47 The CR8 went from 17.66
percent to 29.64 percent,48 which means that the fraction of death
sentences in the eight most active counties went up by about 50
percent. The data are not showing just that fewer counties are
responsible for the capital sentences, but fewer people; the HOI values
indicate that the fraction of the population residing in capitally active
counties fell from about 23 to about 13 percent.49 Moreover, every
metric showed increased concentration over every period—not just
when comparing period 4 to period 1.50
The information in the preceding paragraph shows that there is
increasing concentration nationally, but it does not itself disclose how
that concentration happened. One might hypothesize that
concentration has increased only because fewer states are practicing
the death penalty. After all, roughly four states abandoned the death
penalty during each period in the data.51 A good way to test that
hypothesis is to look at the most active capital-sentencing states—
California, Texas, Florida, Alabama, and North Carolina—and see
whether the national trend is reproduced there.

45. See supra Tables 4, 5.
46. See supra Table 1.
47. See supra Table 1.
48. See supra Table 2.
49. See supra Table 3.
50. See supra Tables 1–3.
51. Thirty-six states capitally sentenced someone in period 1, thirty-four in period 2, thirtyone in period 3, and twenty-six in period 4. See supra Table 1.
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Table 4 contains the state-level detail, and every capitally active
state except Florida experienced substantial concentration.52 The most
dramatic concentration was in North Carolina, where HHI more than
tripled. Concentration index values for states do (predictably) exhibit
a little more period-to-period volatility than do national values. For
example, California appeared to experience some dispersion between
periods 1 and 2; both Texas and Alabama experienced the same
between periods 2 and 3. The state-level detail nonetheless shows that
increasing national concentration is due substantially to increased
concentration within retentionist states.
The county-level detail in Table 6 shows that localities are indeed
reproducing the national trend line, as only one of the ten most active
capital-sentencing counties had more death sentences in period 4 than
in period 1. In terms of its effect on HHI, that trend likely offsets some
of the concentration occurring as infrequent county producers of
capital sentences become abstainers in subsequent periods.
2. Executions. The results for executions are a little more difficult
to interpret. The HHI and CR8 values show increased concentration
between periods 1 and 4, but the intermediate values exhibit more
volatility than they did in the capital sentencing context.53 The HHI and
CR8 values for executions show a substantial jump in concentration
between periods 2 and 3, so there is some corrective dispersion
between periods 3 and 4. (The period 4 values do, however, show more
concentration than there was during period 2.) The HOI trendline
looks a bit different, as HOI actually rises between periods 1 and 4. The
HOI values do show the jump in concentration between periods 1 and
3, and show dispersion in period 4.
The state-level detail—which shows concentration trends in
Texas, Oklahoma, Virginia, Missouri, and Florida—also paints a more
complicated picture. For every state except Florida, both HHI and
CR8 values show increased concentration between periods 1 and 4.
The HOI values, however, showed substantially more concentration
only in Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia. HOI values were roughly the
same in Missouri, and actually rose in Florida. The period-to-period
volatility of all three metrics was considerably greater than it was for
capital sentences.

52. Florida did show nontrivial increases in concentration according to HHI and HOI
metrics; CR8 showed minimal dispersion. See supra Table 4.
53. See supra Tables 1–3.
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In the end, because Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia account for
621 of the 1106 executions in the data (56.15 percent), the considerable
concentration in those three states dominates the more ambiguous
effects in some of the other execution-intensive jurisdictions. The
heightened concentration in these capitally active states suggests that
increased national concentration of executions is not attributable
simply to the number of states with an execution falling from twentyeight to fourteen.54 The national concentration also reflects
concentration within individual states. Moreover, the county-level data
in Texas and Virginia indicate that executions are concentrating in
those states not so much because the capitally active counties are
responsible for more executions, but because a number of infrequent
producers became abstainers.55
Unlike the counties responsible for most death sentences, and as
mentioned above, the counties responsible for the most executions are
not all among the country’s most populous. Oklahoma County is
perhaps the most visible example. Although it accounted for just .23
percent of the national population during period 2, it was responsible
for 7.86 percent of the country’s executions. Between 2001 and 2005,
then, Oklahoma County was “overrepresented” as a producer of
executions by over 3300 percent.
One might expect to observe more overlap between counties
producing the most executions and those producing the most capital
sentences. Some of the overlap disappears because California executed
only eleven offenders56 despite having imposed 483 capital sentences.57
Some actual overlap might also be disguised by the lag between the
moment of sentencing and the moment of execution. A comparison of
the results for capital sentences and executions nevertheless invites a
broader question that is largely beyond the scope of this paper: What
phenomena are causing them to cluster differently within state
jurisdictions?58 I strongly suspect that the differences are attributable
to the way states structure the process of issuing “death warrants”—

54. The surge in period 3 concentration nationally also mirrors the enormous surge in period
3 concentration for Texas. Compare period 3 in Tables 1–3 (showing a surge in national
concentration), supra, with period 3 in Table 5, supra (showing that the number of counties with
an execution in Texas fell from 35 to 27 between period 3 and period 4).
55. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra Table 5.
56. See supra note 1.
57. See supra Table 4.
58. Compare supra Table 4 (providing all values for death sentences at the state level), with
supra Table 5 (providing all values for executions at the state level).
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orders specifying the date and method of execution—but I mostly leave
that question for another day.59 For the purposes of this Article,
readers should simply understand that capital sentences and executions
cluster differently, rather than why.
II. JUSTIFICATION IN LIGHT OF LOCAL MUSCLE MEMORY
Capital sentences and executions are concentrating in a smaller
number of localities—both nationally and, for the most part, within
capitally active states. Part II considers, in light of causation that is
largely bureaucratic and path dependent, how such concentration
squares with the familiar normative justifications for the death penalty:
deterrence (consequentialism) and retribution.60
The geographic distribution of death sentences and executions
does not reflect the concentration of population, the distribution of
homicides, or locally differentiated punishment norms. Although the
data in Part I are incapable of proving this proposition, I argue that the
driving force behind the concentration are likely to be more
bureaucratic than democratic, and more path dependent than
pragmatic. It results from what I have called “local muscle memory,”
which is correlated decisionmaking across local sites of discretion. The
correlation produces the separating equilibrium evident in the data—a
small cluster of capitally active counties that coexist with a much larger
set of counties that abstain from the death penalty entirely.
In light of the role that local muscle memory likely plays, there
might be a weak and empirically speculative consequentialist defense
of concentration: that capitally active localities efficiently produce
deterrence and impose sentences with the most nondeterrent utility.61
By contrast, there appears to be no retributivist defense capable of
honoring a commitment to “comparative proportionality,” the
59. Some states have a centralized entity, such as a governor or supreme court, that
determines the execution queue; other states rely heavily on the local stakeholders to determine
whether to go forward with the execution. In the latter scenario, there is more likely to be
concentration in light of the political and professional opportunities that proceeding with an
execution presents.
60. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (“Gregg instructs that capital
punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the
two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (describing retribution and deterrence as
“social purposes served by the death penalty”); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL
PUNISHMENT 9–13 (1989) (introducing readers to utilitarianism and deterrence as the major
“philosophical theories of punishment”).
61. See infra Part II.B.1.
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principle that similar offenders should receive similar punishment.
There is certainly debate over a pure retributivist’s appropriate
commitment to comparative proportionality, but I do not want to dwell
too much on that point.62 Even if the retributivist jettisons any interest
in comparative proportionality, capital-outcome concentration still
violates a basic equality norm of modern punishment practice.63 The
philosophical harm in the practiced reality of locally differentiated
capital punishment activity is the unjustified failure to treat similar
cases similarly, regardless of what penological theory most readily
accounts for that principle.
A. Local Muscle Memory
Normative discussion of capital-outcome concentration requires
an exclusion of certain causes. Concentration does not reflect
population or the distribution of homicides, and it does not happen
because juries effectively transmit a community’s punishment norms
through verdicts. The cause more likely involves local muscle memory:
some combination of extreme bureaucratic path dependence—such as
the inherited practices of a large DA’s office—and otherwise
correlated decisionmaking exercised by stakeholders at multiple sites
of local discretion.
1. Excluding Basic Causes. What if the cause of concentration is
benign? Perhaps what shows up as variation simply reflects differences
in population or in the distribution of sufficiently culpable homicides.
Such explanations, however, are inconsistent with the data here, and
with what other studies reveal about the practice of capital punishment.
a. Population. Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent focuses on the
number of counties that impose death sentences,64 which invites the
objection that those counties nonetheless house a considerable fraction
of the population. HOI, however, exposes the limits of that objection.
Nationally, the fraction of the population in counties accounting for
half of the country’s death sentences has fallen from 24 percent to 14

62. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
63. The Western proposition that like phenomena should be treated the same way dates
back at least to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 267–69 (H. Rackham
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2014) (c. 350 B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA, in
METAPHYSICS X–XIV, OECONOMICA, AND MAGNA MORALIA bk. I, at 533–43 (G. Cyril
Armstrong ed., Hugh Tredennick trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1935) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
64. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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percent.65 For executions, the number has increased from 7 to 8
percent.66 Moreover, HOI has dropped sharply within each of the five
states with the most capital sentences.67 The only reported HOI results
in which the relationship to population is ambiguous are for executions
in Oklahoma, Missouri, and Florida.68 In short, the data corroborate
the intuition—capital punishment is practiced by a diminishing
minority of Americans, both nationally and (generally) within capitally
active states.
b. Homicides. Another benign explanation for capital-outcome
concentration is that the data disclose comparatively proportional
punishment because they track the distribution of culpable homicides.
Notwithstanding that some empirical studies of death penalty states
report modest county-level correlation between homicide rates and the
number of inmates actually sitting on death row,69 the idea that
concentration is tracking culpability remains farfetched.
First, as a purely logical matter, that homicides correlate positively
with death sentences does not mean that a geographic distribution of
capital events looks anything like a geographic distribution of similar
offense–offender combinations.70 Time after time, studies have shown
that the ratio of death sentences to homicides can vary substantially
between materially similar counties in the same state jurisdiction.71

65. See supra Table 3.
66. See supra Table 3.
67. See supra Table 4.
68. See supra Table 5.
69. See, e.g., John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in
the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 822 (2005) (noting that “causation may run from
homicides to executions”); Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 354–55 (“In short, consistent with statelevel findings, the number of murders in a geographical unit (the county) is likely the single most
influential factor determining the number of persons on death row due to murders in the unit.”).
70. A homicide, death sentence, and execution would almost always happen in different
years. See, e.g., Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T CRIMINAL JUSTICE, https://www.tdcj.state.
tx.us/death_row/dr_offenders_on_dr.html [https://perma.cc/N97W-YDP4] (displaying pertinent
homicide and death sentence data for offenders on Texas’s death row).
71. See DAVID C. BALDUS, CHARLES A. PULASKI & GEORGE G. WOODWORTH, EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 121, 128 (1990); SAMUEL L. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO,
DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 64–65 (1984);
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND’S
DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL
JURISDICTION 26 (2003), http://www.aclu-md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0377/md_death_penalty_
race_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYQ7-274Q]; William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067–1100 (1983); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and
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Second, the distribution of capital sentences lacks substantial
geographic correspondence with homicides. I performed a simple
analysis of the relationship between capital sentences and homicides,
which I reported in Table 8. I looked at the counties that were
responsible for half of a jurisdiction’s capital sentences and, using
homicide data from the CDC,72 computed the fraction of the
jurisdiction’s homicides occurring in those same counties. Ideally, half
of a jurisdiction’s death sentences should correspond with half of its
homicides.73 Nationally, however, the fraction of homicides associated
with half of American death sentences fell from 36 percent during
period 1 to 18 percent during period 4. Within capitally active states,
the same trend line is usually downward sloping, although it is more
gradual and there are some outliers.74 Those outliers notwithstanding,
the basic insight is obvious enough: the concentration of capital
punishment does not correspond to the distribution of homicides.
These results confirm more rigorous regression analysis of data across
local jurisdictions within individual states, which show that capitalsentencing patterns do not reflect the types of homicides committed in
the different localities.75

Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 563, 604 tbl.5
(1980); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System
Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 637, 650 (2014); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALI
Concerning Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 390 (2010).
72. See supra note 24.
73. I computed this value for death sentences rather than executions because, as between
the two, the evidence that there is some correlation between homicides and death sentences is
much stronger. See infra note 79.
74. The figure fell over three percentage points in California, over four points in Texas,
almost thirteen points in Florida, sixteen points in Alabama, and almost twenty-eight points in
North Carolina. See supra Table 8.
75. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 71, at 673 (“Indeed, the most consistent and undisputed
finding in all the regression analyses of Connecticut data by both experts is that the single most
important influence from 1973–2007 explaining whether a death-eligible defendant would be
sentenced to death was whether the crime occurred in Waterbury.”); PATERNOSTER & BRAME,
supra note 71, at 31 (“In other words, differences in how different [Maryland] jurisdictions handle
death eligible cases cannot be attributed to the kinds of homicides committed in those
jurisdictions.”); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate
Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1,
38 (2005) (“The data also show geographic variations in rates of death sentencing [in California].
Excluding counties with smaller populations, death sentencing rates vary from roughly .005% of
all homicides to rates five times higher.”); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region,
and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 67 (2002) (“Indicators of two
extra-legal factors, the race of first-degree murder victims and geographic region, were found
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Third, the distribution of executions also maps poorly onto the
distribution of homicides.76 Almost 40 percent of American homicides
are in counties that have not executed anyone since Furman.77 The
twenty most capitally active counties account for 35 percent of
American executions, but just 12 percent of its homicides.78
Fourth, showing that capital outcomes track the distribution of
homicides requires proof of more than correspondence between static
maps of each. Unless the change in capital-outcome distribution
corresponds to a change in homicide distribution—which even a
superficial view of the data excludes79—the latter cannot explain the
former.
2. Excluding Differentiated Punishment Norms. In some ways,
every county has its own story, and I generalize at my own peril.
Political units experiencing concentration nonetheless have certain
attributes in common, including the sets of local stakeholders that
influence outcomes. The accumulated decisionmaking of each
stakeholder set both reflects and produces what I call local muscle
memory: the correlated exercise of local discretion. If concentration is
indeed the result of the bureaucratic inertia and path dependence that
mark muscle memory, then outcome irregularity cannot, as some might
argue, be justified as a reflection of locally differentiated punishment
norms.
Understanding muscle memory requires familiarity with the local
stakeholders themselves—and, more importantly, why their
decisionmaking outcomes might correlate. Any modern capital event
is the result of a local crime. The response to local crime is meted out
largely through the discretionary practice of local police, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, juries, and judges. Stakeholders have discretion that
substantially affects capital outcomes, and certain discretionary
statistically related to the imposition of the death sentence in Illinois controlling on the other
variables in this study.”).
76. See Frank R. Baumgartner, Woody Gram, Kaneesha R. Johnson, Arvind Krishnamurthy
& Colin P. Wilson, The Geographic Distribution of US Executions, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 10–15 (2016).
77. See id. at 10.
78. See id.
79. However, because I do not formally analyze the longitudinal effect of local changes in
homicide volume on local changes in capital process, my data does not itself disprove the
correspondence. I can claim only that such a correspondence is extraordinarily unlikely. It is
worth noting that, even at the national level, there seems to be no longitudinal correlation
between homicides and executions. See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 69, at 836.
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decisions tend to correlate with others. That correlation, in turn,
produces sustained capital activity in some large localities and
abstention in many others.
The first coercive exercise of state power in the capitalpunishment sequence is an arrest executed by local law enforcement,
usually following an investigation. The idea that policing involves
considerable discretion needs little discussion,80 and such discretion can
suppress the relationship between culpability and punishment. For
example, local policing practice certainly plays a role in the welldocumented phenomenon that the death penalty is used
disproportionately to punish offenders who kill white victims.81 Police
tend to more strongly support the death penalty,82 and police unions
can have considerable political clout—influence that is most visibly
reflected in the especially harsh punishment for killing a law
enforcement officer.83 Influential police unions are disproportionally
present in large localities,84 and such presence correlates with that of
larger prosecutors’ offices that most aggressively and efficaciously seek
capital sentences.85
Indeed, perhaps the greatest (if not most visible) source of local
variation is the discretion of the local prosecutor, which is more
appropriately described as the correlated discretion exercised within
the local prosecutor’s office. (A locally elected DA usually leads that
office.86) The prosecutor investigates the crime, decides whether to
capitally indict the defendant, negotiates any plea, performs jury
selection, tries both the guilt and sentencing phases of a case for the
state, conducts much of the state’s postconviction litigation, and—in
some jurisdictions—seeks the death warrant that formally initiates the
countdown to an execution.87

80. See David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2014).
81. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987) (citing the famous “Baldus study”).
82. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION 289 (2010) (“In American death penalty politics, among the most reliable
and active supporters of capital punishment are police officers, prison guards, and local district
attorneys.”).
83. See id. at 289 (“Police union officials demand death sentences for ‘cop killers’ and regard
the issue as a test of any politician’s support.”).
84. See JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 91 (2013).
85. See infra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.
86. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
533 (2001) (“The large majority of local district attorneys are elected.”).
87. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007) (exploring the discretion vested in prosecutors’ offices).
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Multiple studies confirm that prosecutorial discretion has an
extremely substantial effect on the pattern of capital charging within a
state.88 For example, larger prosecutor’s offices benefit from
economies of scale in selecting juries—that is, the cost of “death
qualifying” a jury (defined below) goes down as the office accumulates
experience. Effective capital prosecution necessitates overhead and
experience available only in larger localities with better-funded
offices,89 which is one reason why capital outcomes tend to cluster
there.90 Judges and prosecutors face similar electorates,91 and capitally
inclined prosecutors dominate in those same large localities that house
strong police unions. The discretion lodged in a DA’s office combines
with the political economy of crime control to account for the
phenomenon that, when there are more elections in certain localities,
there is more capital punishment.92 When local prosecutors make all of
these decisions in different bureaucratic ecosystems, the result is an
irregular distribution of capital outcomes.93
The prosecutors, however, are only half of the adversarial
equation. An underappreciated (but less correlated) source of local
variation is the bureaucratic configuration of capital defense. Some
localities use underfunded county public defenders94 or panels of
88. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 125–30 (1987) (North Carolina); PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 71, at 26–31, 37–
39 (Maryland); Leigh B. Bienan, Neil Alan Weiner, Deborah W. Denno, Paul D. Allison &
Douglas Lane Mills, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 178–84 (1988) (New Jersey); Bowers, supra
note 71, at 1079 (Florida); Donohue, supra note 71, at 673 (Connecticut); Raymond Paternoster,
Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 779–80 (1979) (South Carolina).
89. See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 282 (“Jurisdictions with relatively small
populations may not have the tax base to support a public prosecutor.”).
90. See supra Table 6.
91. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 20 (1999).
92. For sources discussing correlation between elections and judicial discretion in favor of
death sentences, see Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal Elections: Gubernatorial Politics
and the Timing of Executions, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2003); Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court
and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 307–08 (2008); sources cited infra note 106.
93. See, e.g., John G. Douglass, Death as a Bargaining Chip: Plea Bargaining and the Future
of Virginia’s Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 874 (2015) (explaining the phenomenon in
Virginia).
94. See Smith, supra note 92, at 304 (“The fees for court-appointed cases are usually capped
[by the legislature], often at unrealistically low levels that cannot be waived by trial judges. Low
fees can have adverse selection effects, leading the best-qualified defense attorneys to opt out of
the system in favor of more remunerative cases.”).
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private counsel,95 but regional capital defender offices dramatically
improve outcomes.96 Many states do not even have a public defender’s
office accountable for state postconviction litigation,97 and the inmate
representation at that phase of capital litigation is frequently quite
poor.98 Some localities will pull lawyers from a rotating panel of
nonspecialists, although luckier inmates might be represented by a
government-funded postconviction office, such as a capital habeas unit
(CHU).99 Gaps in representation are filled by nonprofit organizations
or by firms doing pro bono work.100 In short, the geographic
distribution of capital outcomes is influenced heavily by bureaucratic
decisions about how to staff capital litigation on behalf of the
condemned.101
In addition to the police and the lawyers, judges fulfill a crucial
role in the local administration of capital process. The local judge
obviously presides over all pretrial motions and the trial itself. For
decades, some judges exercised state power to “override” a life
sentence and impose what that judge viewed as a more appropriate
death penalty.102 (After Hurst v. Florida,103 however, state power to vest
judges with such authority is in doubt.104) The local judge is also the
trial-level judge in the state postconviction proceeding and, in many

95. Robert E. Stein, Public Defenders, 39 HUM. RTS. 25, 26 (2013).
96. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based
Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 346–48 (2015) (noting that a study of
the Wichita Public Defender demonstrated that “public defenders provided more services to
clients and obtained more dismissals at lower per-case cost than private assigned counsel in
comparable cases”).
97. Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2442–
43 (2013).
98. See Jordan M. Steiker, Improving Representation in Capital Cases: Establishing the Right
Baselines in Federal Habeas to Promote Structural Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293,
294 (2007) (“[D]eficient trial representation is often followed and compounded by equally poor
representation in state-post-conviction.”).
99. See generally Lugo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 750 F.3d 1198, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014)
(discussing the effect of CHUs on the quality of capital litigation).
100. See Carol S. Steiker, Raising the Bar: Maples v. Thomas and the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel, 127 HARV. L. REV. 468, 470 (2013).
101. Unlike some of the other correlated features of muscle memory, there appears to be little
data confirming or disproving how the presence of a public or quasi-public defense entity
correlates with behavior of other local stakeholders.
102. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2015).
103. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
104. See id. at 621 (holding that Florida’s capital-sentencing system, in which juries provided
“advisory” verdicts and judges actually decided on the sentence, was unconstitutional).
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jurisdictions, decides whether to issue the death warrant.105 As is the
case with elected prosecutors, political cycles distort the ways in which
elected judges exercise their considerable discretion.106 Moreover,
because local judges frequently face the same electorates as
prosecutors, the two sets of officials can be subject to a correlated
political distortion.
The local institutional practice that is most superficially
inconsistent with the idea of muscle memory is jury deliberation. The
jury is generally considered the most legitimate source of local
variation, regarded as a normatively acceptable proxy for community
preference.107 Under the Sixth Amendment, juries must be drawn from
the community in which the crime was committed and the offender is
tried.108 The jury formally considers the offense at the guilt phase and
offender culpability at the punishment phase. The Constitution
requires that juries be able to consider and give effect to any evidence
that mitigates the defendant’s culpability,109 so the punishment phase
frequently becomes a forum for the local jury to hear about the
circumstances of the defendant’s upbringing, as well as any mental
health issues or trauma. Particularly at the sentencing phase, the jury
becomes an important surrogate for the locality’s punishment norms.
Indeed, the jury is usually presented as a singular legitimizing force in
the administration of capital punishment, a black box of twelve into
which any number of institutional biases disappear or otherwise gain
immunity from more exacting legal scrutiny.
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of the claim that
juries disrupt—rather than aggravate—the correlated decisionmaking
of local muscle memory. The first reason is that such a function is
inconsistent with the data. Local variation in capital-outcome intensity

105. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.710 (West 2002); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
43.141 (West 2006). But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.218 (West 2016) (vesting power in the
state supreme court and governor).
106. See Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 370–71 (2008) (“[E]lections and strong public
opinion exert a notable and significant direct influence on judge decision making in [capital]
cases.”); Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Uneven Justice: In States with Elected High Court Judges,
a Harder Line on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges [https://perma.cc/FKK4-5KEY].
107. See Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 830–35 (2015) (“In the
process, and in the context of the case before it, the jury offers an opportunity for the people to
ensure that the law reflects their own values and expectations.”).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
109. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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is simply enormous, and the jury pools would have to have implausibly
divergent assessments of culpability to justify the pattern. More
importantly, the data disclose not just substantial variation, but
substantial variation among counties that are similar and close
together.110 The idea that juries in Houston and San Francisco might
represent a dramatically different set of preferences is one thing; the
idea that the same can be said of juries in Houston and Dallas is
another.111 The jury-based explanation is also difficult to reconcile with
the execution-concentration data. Juries have no role in securing a
death warrant. If capital-outcome concentration reflects differentiated
community views about punishment, then the sentencing and
execution distributions should resemble one another.
There are also structural reasons to reject the idea that the local
jury constrains local muscle memory. The capital jury is a poor
institutional mechanism for translating a community’s punishment
preferences because of the idiosyncratic way that petit jurors are
selected. Specifically, prosecutors may have the court dismiss members
of the venire (the jury pool) who have philosophical reservations about
imposing the death penalty—a practice known as “death qualifying”
the jury.112 Larger prosecutor’s offices benefit substantially from prior
experience with death qualification, which involves skillful questioning
of the venire and judicious use of “strikes” against individual jurors. A
death-qualified jury excludes precisely the people who are most likely
to vote in favor of an acquittal or against a capital sentence.113 By
definition, those juries fail to transmit the punishment norms that are
most inconsistent with capital sentencing. Death qualification results in
a not-terribly-representative petit jury uniquely disposed to convict
and capitally sentence inmates,114 a circumstance making the

110. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 71, at 390–91 (“[The] simple facts of institutional
organization generate enormous geographic disparities within most death penalty jurisdictions.”).
111. See id. at 391 (“[G]eographic disparities are troubling . . . because they suggest that state
death penalty legislation is unable to standardize the considerations that are brought to bear in
capital prosecutions so as to limit major fluctuations in its application across the state.”).
112. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986).
113. See James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court
Decisionmaking and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 379, 391 (2004)
(“[D]eath-qualified juries may be more disposed toward guilty verdicts than juries that include
[death penalty opponents] because jurors who are not opposed to the death penalty may be more
generally conviction prone than [death penalty opponents].” (citing Claudia L. Cowan, William
C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition
to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984))).
114. See id.
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prosecutor’s discretionary charging decision even more influential.
Consistent with the idea of local correlation, the larger communities
containing more jurors with disqualifying scruples are precisely those
communities in which prosecutors with the most resources are best
equipped to disqualify them.115
Local muscle memory is transmitted through established electoral
strategies in local primaries and general elections,116 through the
informal practices of individual prosecutors and local DA’s offices,117
and through local norms of judicial process touching all phases of
capital litigation. In certain localities, capital litigation can represent a
source of political and professional opportunity for the police,
prosecutors, judges, and executives that collectively perform the law
enforcement function.118 In those localities, the bureaucracy is simply
good at capital process.119 To phrase my explanation in the cold
economic terms necessary for maximum clarity—if a capital outcome
is an asset, localities that produce many death sentences and executions
do so because of heavy political demand and cheap bureaucratic
supply.
There are other data that support a muscle-memory hypothesis.
Political scientist Frank Baumgartner has observed that the extreme
distribution of executions across U.S. counties corresponds to what
statisticians call a “power law.”120 A power law is an irregular frequency
distribution for which, when measuring on the y-axis for the frequency
of observations having some x-axis value c, very large values of c are

115. One reason why cities might house a higher fraction of disqualified jurors is the
substantial difference in attitudes about the death penalty between white and nonwhite
communities. See J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification of
Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1134 (2014).
116. See Owen G. Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have
Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286, 295 (2002).
117. See Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor
Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 53, 59–80 (1981); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black
Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 178 (2008); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion
in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1345 (1993).
118. See GARLAND, supra note 82, at 287–93.
119. See David R. Dow, Why Texas Is So Good at the Death Penalty, POLITICO (May 15,
2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/texas-death-penalty-106736 [https://
perma.cc/J4WX-C4QU]; infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
120. See Frank R. Baumgartner, A Power-Law of Death, GEORGETOWN PUB. POL’Y INST.
(Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/Baumgartner-Power-Law-of-Deathgtown.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z663-6FNH].
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unusually likely to occur.121 A bit more simply, if a power law describes
a distribution, then the odds of observing freakishly large c values are
high.122 Normal distributions dominate the natural sciences, but power
laws appear often in contexts in which the frequency of measured
phenomena reflect correlated decisionmaking.123 Specifically, powerlaw distributions have thick tails due to self-reinforcing feedback
effects.
The execution data likely fit Baumgartner’s power law because
the execution data are showing precisely the behavior that is producing
the concentration evident in my metrics.124 Local variation in
retributive norms cannot explain the local variation in capital
activity.125 The self-reinforcing quality of the feedback explains not just
why capital outcomes are concentrated, but why they are concentrating.
Counties that have not practiced capital punishment in the past tend
not to practice it in the future, and capitally active localities exhibit
precisely the opposite tendency. Capital activity breeds more capital
activity, and abstention breeds abstention. Self-reinforcement accounts
for the extreme and accelerating concentration documented in Part I,
and it is the local muscle memory to which I allude in this Article.
B. The Weak Consequentialist Justification
A comprehensive normative analysis of death sentencing and
execution patterns is difficult without a granular understanding of why
activity is rising or falling in each locality. My ambition is more modest.
My inquiry is focused on excluding broad explanations for a set of
observations, however, so extreme granularity is unnecessary. I am
comfortable analyzing generally the consequentialist and retributivist
justifications for the death penalty, in light of the basic assumptions
about local path dependence and bureaucratic inertia articulated
above.
The first of the two major penological theories invoked to support
capital punishment is consequentialism, under which justification
121. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS:
REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 479–81 (2010).
122. See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 147 (2003).
123. See EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 121, at 479, 482.
124. In fact, the power law was first observed in an attempt to understand income
concentration. See Thomas Bak, Power-Law Distributions and the Federal Judiciary, 46
JURIMETRICS J. 139, 140 n.3 (2006).
125. See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 169–78 (1991).
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follows from costs and benefits materializing in the real world.126
Consequentialism does not prioritize equal punishment per se; equality
has only instrumental importance.127 The major consequentialist
accounts of capital punishment focus on deterrent effects,128 and so I
begin there.
The idea that capital-outcome concentration increases deterrence
is either empirically untested or untestable. There is some meaningful
empirical work on the deterrent effect of capital outcomes generally,
although both the existence and intensity of that effect remain in
serious doubt.129 There is no empirical work whatsoever on the effect
126. See David O. Brink, Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View, 83 J. PHIL. 417,
420 (1986).
127. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23 (rev. ed. 1999) (noting that distributive
considerations are of instrumental importance to utilitarians).
128. See infra notes 129, 131 and accompanying text.
129. The empirical dispute is well known. Before 1975, the deterrent studies employed one of
three matching techniques: comparing contemporaneous homicide rates of nearby states,
comparing homicide rates during periods of capital activity and inactivity, and comparing
homicide trends before and after high-profile capital events. See ROBERT M. BOHM,
DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 85–88 (1999) (collecting studies). The most prominent were performed
by sociologist Thorsten Sellin, who compared homicide rates in contiguous states between 1920
and 1963. See Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 135, 135–38 (1967). No study using such methods disclosed a deterrent effect. See
id. at 88. In 1975, economist Isaac Ehrlich published the first study finding a deterrent effect, using
multivariate regression analysis of data from 1933 to 1969 to report that each execution deterred
somewhere between seven to eight homicides. See generally Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect
of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). Ehrlich
argued that prior methods had used proxies for statistical controls that were incapable of allowing
anyone to isolate a deterrent effect. See id. at 398. Ehrlich’s analysis subsequently came under fire
for, among other things: having insufficiently controlled for important variables, having
insufficiently recognized the need to compare the deterrent effect of the death penalty with the
next-most severe punishment (life without parole), and having failed to disclose that the effect
disappeared without the last five years of data in the sample. See BOHM, supra, at 89 (discussing
failure to compare to life-without-parole); David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison
of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85
YALE L.J. 170, 180 (1975) (discussing insufficient controls); Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445, 445 (1977)
(concluding that the final five years of Ehrlich’s dataset distorted his general conclusions). In 1978,
the National Academy of Sciences issued a report fiercely criticizing Ehrlich’s methods and
conclusions. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen &
Daniel Nagin eds., 1978). There has been a recent surge in empirical work that is less critical of
Ehrlich’s conclusions, although that work has failed to convince many observers that the death
penalty’s effect on the homicide rate can be reliably isolated. See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note
69, at 793 n.11 (collecting newer studies); id. at 794 (“Our estimates suggest not just ‘reasonable
doubt’ about whether there is any deterrent effect of the death penalty, but profound
uncertainty.”).
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of geographic irregularities on deterrence, and the ability to measure
deterrent effect with such granularity seems far beyond the existing
capacity of anybody in the field.
One could nonetheless hazard a guess as to how a consequentialist
might support capital-outcome concentration. First, concentration
might produce nondeterrence benefits. Second, the production of
geographically concentrated capital outcomes may simply be less
expensive than the dispersed alternative.
1. Non-Deterrence Rationales. For reasons that may already be
apparent, I prefer the term “consequentialism” to “deterrence.”
Although death penalty discourse frequently positions “deterrence” as
the normative foil for the deontological concept of “retribution,”130
deterrence is merely a central benefit in the consequentialist
justification of capital punishment.131 Moreover, and contrary to
popular usage, consequentialism is not synonymous with a utilitarian
preference for maximizing the hedonic surplus of pleasure over pain;132
utilitarianism is simply a type of consequentialism.133 Consequentialist
paradigms require a comparison of benefits and costs, however those
are measured.134
On the benefit side, the emphasis on deterrence is underinclusive.
A capital sanction achieves the maximum conceivable incapacitation,
and incapacitation—along with deterrence and reformation—is a
broadly recognized means of crime prevention.135 More importantly,
however, the death penalty might conceivably have two aspects of what
I call a “satisfaction benefit,” which do not involve crime prevention at
all.136 First, capital outcomes are a source of vindictive utility for a

130. See Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1283, 1307 (2006).
131. See Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 421,
435 (2014).
132. See Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
889, 896 (2009).
133. See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral
Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 329 (2008).
134. See id. at 371.
135. See Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 568 (2003).
136. Cf. PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 21–22 (using the term “vindictive satisfaction” to
describe the first of the two phenomena I specify).
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victim’s community—including the victim’s family.137 Second, the
death penalty might be loss-aversive insofar as it avoids the social costs
associated with extralegal means of securing community satisfaction,
such as private revenge, vigilantism, or lynching.138
The concept of a satisfaction benefit is central to at least one
consequentialist theory that concentrated capital outcomes perform a
meaningful function. Capital outcomes could be concentrating in
communities for which both aspects of the satisfaction benefit are
highest. All other things being equal, if states impose and carry out
death sentences in the local communities that derive the greatest
vindictive utility from such practices, then concentration is less
consequentially problematic.139 Moreover, if the communities in which
capital outcomes concentrate are especially prone to extralegal means
of satisfaction, then those outcomes displace something else quite
costly. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the most capitally
active localities are those in which (1) communities derive the most
vindictive utility from that activity, and (2) the death penalty displaces
a more harmful community response.140 The muscle-memory
phenomenon complicates the vindictive satisfaction story
considerably, however, because capital activity levels may not
correspond strongly with community punishment preferences.

137. See Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1734 (2006) (citing Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing
Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 52 (2000)); Jack Greenberg, Against the
American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1677 n.39 (1986).
138. Justice Stewart alluded to this idea in his Furman concurrence. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
139. This is a big “if.” Victims may not feel closure either because a death sentence is
frequently imposed without a corresponding execution, or because, even when an execution
happens, the feeling of relief may be less than anticipated. See generally Marilyn Peterson Armour
& Mark S. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors:
A Two State Comparison, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2012) (reporting empirical work on survivor
experience).
140. There is some reason to believe that capitally active jurisdictions are disproportionately
vulnerable to vigilantism and lynching. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89–90, 93, 96–98 (2003); see also Steven F. Messner, Eric P.
Baumer & Richard Rosenfeld, Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and Support for
Capital Punishment, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 559, 579 (2006) (“In addition, the main effect of the
vigilante tradition is significant . . . . [W]hites who reside in states where lynching was more
prevalent . . . are significantly more likely than others to support the death penalty.”); Steven F.
Messner, Robert D. Baller & Matthew P. Zevenbergen, The Legacy of Lynching and Southern
Homicide, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 634 (2005) (“[T]he legacy of lynching during this dark era of
America’s past may help explain variation in the level of homicides within the South in more
contemporary times.”).
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A second consequentialist justification for capital-outcome
concentration centers on cost.141 Concentration might be providing
some sort of deterrence benefit by shifting outcomes from localities
that produce capital events at high cost to localities that produce them
less expensively. Local muscle memory provides less of a reason to be
skeptical here, because the activity in high-volume jurisdictions
probably does bespeak a morbid proficiency. I discussed the myriad
local institutions that collectively produce capital outcomes in Part
II.A.2, and suffice it to say that capital prosecutions, appeals,
postconviction litigation, and incarceration are very expensive.142
There are economies of scale in training prosecutors, educating judges,
and preparing expert witnesses.143 If capital-outcome concentration can
produce the same benefits at a lesser cost, then the migration of
outcomes from costlier to less expensive localities represents a
consequential benefit.
2. Problems with Pure Consequentialist Rationales. Aside from
general skepticism about the premises of vindictive satisfaction,144
there are at least two other serious problems with the pure
consequentialist rationales. The first is a problem common to all pure
consequentialist theories, and the second is unique to capital-outcome
concentration.
First, the sort of pure consequentialist account necessary to sustain
extreme capital concentration runs into objections that have dogged
the theory for years. The most famous is the Rawlsian “scapegoating
objection” that consequentialism permits welfare-promoting
punishment of innocent offenders.145 Capital-outcome concentration
141. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 37 (“Utilitarians would want punishments to be
effective, but at a reasonable price.”).
142. See Public Policy Choices and Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Critical Review of
New Evidence: Hearing on H.B. 3834 Before the Joint Comm. on Judiciary of Mass. Leg., 2005
Leg., 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan, Columbia Law School).
143. Cf. Dow, supra note 119 (explaining that Texas is proficient at executing people because
it is experienced).
144. See supra note 139.
145. See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the
Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 123–27 (2000) (collecting canonical authority); Kyron Huigens,
Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 33–34 (2003) (“The
scapegoating objection points out that if punishment is justified by deterrence, or by any other
beneficial consequences, then a net gain in good consequences should be pursued regardless of
traditional notions of guilt and desert.”); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 11
(1955) (discussing the problems inherent in punishing an innocent offender for the best interests
of society). Consequentialist theorists have long argued (with only limited success) that certain
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does not necessarily entail punishment of innocent people and is
therefore not formally vulnerable to the objection, but scapegoating is
the extreme example of consequentialist insensitivity to
blameworthiness. Capital-outcome concentration does trigger
concerns about consequentialism’s tolerance for the related problem
of exemplary punishment, in which the state imposes extreme penalties
on a subset of offenders.146 Accepting a pure consequentialist
justification for capital-outcome concentration means swallowing the
proposition that the state may permissibly increase social welfare
through a blame-insensitive distribution of punishment. Whatever
feature of pure consequentialism that would justify concentration is
likely the same feature that justifies tolerance for welfare-enhancing
risk of wrongful executions.
Second, a pure consequentialist case for capital-outcome
concentration would necessitate a number of logical propositions that
are empirically untested or untestable. For example, and as mentioned
above, there are no data to support the proposition that concentrated
capital outcomes produce meaningful increments of net general
deterrence. Nested inside the marginal-deterrence premise is another
assumption—that the death penalty has a deterrent effect as a general
matter—and even that assumption is heavily disputed.147
*

*

*

There is some empirical evidence that capital events are
concentrating in jurisdictions with greater indicia of vindictive
satisfaction, so there may be something to a consequentialist
justification.148 Although there are no data reporting the costs of
producing capital events in different jurisdictions, the idea that
experience increases proficiency and reduces cost is sufficiently

versions of the paradigm preclude scapegoating. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1968) (describing as “definitional stop” the semantic practice of defining
punishment of the innocent out of existence); T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr.
McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 254, 275 (1965) (arguing that implausibility of scapegoating counsels
against a prominent role in normative theory).
146. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 41; Andrew von Hirsch, Hybrid Principles in
Allocating Sanctions: A Response to Professor Robinson, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 64, 65 (1987).
147. For a discussion of the history of the empirical dispute, see supra note 129.
148. See supra note 140; see also James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice,
Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 273 (2011) (positing a
statistical relationship between capital sentencing and receptivity to the vigilante streak more
prevalent among libertarian communities).
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intuitive to resist out-of-hand dismissal. When combined with the
vindictive utility benefit, the efficiency rationale could theoretically
form a weak consequentialist case for capital-outcome concentration—
albeit one vulnerable to some of the most trenchant critiques of that
penal theory.
C. Retributivist Constraints
History’s most famous retributivist is whoever declared that the
punishment must fit the crime. Widely associated with Kant and
Hegel,149 retributivism embodies the principle that punishment
requites “desert.”150 Desert, in turn, is a function of a crime (offense)
and a criminal’s culpability (offender).151 To the extent one rejects pure
consequentialism—which virtually every modern penal practice
does152—punishment must satisfy some retributive constraint on the
state’s authority to penalize wrongdoing.153 Retributivist punishment
theory mutes many of the normative objections hounding pure
utilitarian models. A retributivist constraint, for example, bars a state
from promoting social welfare by punishing innocent people or by
imposing exemplary penalties.154
Most strains of retributivism, in contrast to consequentialism,
involve a thicker commitment to the idea that the state must impose
comparable punishment on equally culpable offenders (comparative
proportionality).155 Unless a theory either recognizes local punishment
149. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 101 at 129 (Allen W.
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF
RIGHT 195 (W. Hastie trans., 2002) (1797); cf. PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 13 (“The most
important and influential among classical retributivists are Kant and Hegel.”).
150. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363–65 (1983); Russell L.
Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843,
860 (2002); Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 188,
188 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1998).
151. See supra note 150.
152. See infra note 161; cf. Christopher, supra note 131, at 476 (explaining that the
“constitutionality of capital punishment relies primarily on retributivism”).
153. See Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 584 (2015);
Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683–
84 (2005).
154. See Kenneth W. Simons, On Equality, Bias Crimes, and Just Deserts, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 237, 237 (2000).
155. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 156 (2001); C.L.
TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 51 (1987); Dan
Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive
Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 975 (2010); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance
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practice as constitutive of desert or permits localities to punish similar
desert differently, irregular capital-outcome distribution will violate
comparative-proportionality norms.156 Even such niche theories of
local variation come up short, however, because local muscle memory
is inconsistent with some key empirical assumptions they make to
justify concentration. Faced with local variation that has little to do
with differences in punishment norms, the only retributivist recourse is
to sever any commitment to comparative proportionality, in which case
the objection to capital-outcome concentration could simply be
restated as a violation of a freestanding norm of penal equality.157
1. The Negative Retributivist Constraint. Pure retributivism has
substantial problems. First, if penal theory exists as both an abstract
justification for the institution of punishment and as a particularized
set of rules for distributing it, retributivism is considerably better at the
second job. Most would believe that societies have penal institutions to
prevent wrongdoing, not to fulfill moral obligations.158 Second, the
purest retributivist theories involve rules not just about when a state
may punish, but when it must. For that reason, retributive theory is

of Wrongdoing, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 251; see also Russell L. Christopher, The
Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 131–32 (2003)
(“Though not always articulated as an express tenet of retributivism, treating equally situated
culpable wrongdoers equally is implicit in, or presupposed by, retributivism.”); George P.
Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 59 (1999)
(“In view of the fact that all theories of justice are primarily concerned with equality, it makes
sense to ground retributive justice as well in a commitment to bring about equality . . . among
offenders.”); David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1620 n.3 (2010)
(describing comparative proportionality as being “usually credited to retributivist theories of
punishment”). Professor Ernest van den Haag, however, was a retributivist who spent his career
disputing that justice had a distributive element. See William S. Laufer & Nien-hê Hsieh,
Choosing Equal Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 343, 343–44 (2003) (summarizing van den Haag’s
position and collecting sources).
156. I assume the retributivist theory also reaches the magnitude of the penalty, as the
correlation between desert and the magnitude of punishment is a mainline premise of most
retributivism. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1234–35 n.669 (2001) (collecting sources).
157. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 49–
50 (2010) (discussing the concept of equality and its fundamental importance in a just society).
158. “Rule utilitarianism” describes the cluster of theories under which utilitarianism
provides the abstract justification for punishment, but leaves questions of distribution for another
moral principle. See ROBERT CUNNINGHAM, SITUATIONISM AND THE NEW MORALITY 37 (1970)
(defining rule utilitarianism); Rawls, supra note 145, at 10–13; see also Richard Brandt, Toward a
Credible Form of Utilitarianism in Morality and the Language of Conduct, in ETHICS: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 118, 121 (Manuel Velasquez & Cynthia Rostankowski eds., 1985) (specifying a
set of rule utilitarian criteria).
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vulnerable to criticism that it calls for excessive punishment even when
it serves no broader social purpose.159 Finally, although most agree that
desert turns on the gravity of the offense and the culpability of the
offender, retributive theory lacks a satisfying normative account of
how the state should schedule deserved punishment.160 Viewing
retributivism as a mixed bag, many theorists favor synthetic models
combining consequentialist and retributivist features—usually
combinations in which consequentialism animates the purpose of
punishment generally and retributivism limits its application in
individual cases.161 The variation in synthetic theory is substantial,162
and exploring it is largely (but not entirely) beyond the scope of this
Article.
The role of synthetic theory differs somewhat depending on
whether the pertinent inquiry involves “positive” or “negative”
retributivism. There exists an important theoretical distinction
between the retributivist ideas that desert creates a state duty to impose
punishment (positive retributivism) and that it creates a state right to
do so (negative retributivism). The positive retributivist believes that
desert morally obligates state punishment, and the negative
retributivist believes that desert permits it.163 Under positive
159. See A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A
GENERAL THEORY OF ETHICS 18 (1929).
160. “Empirical desert” is a term generally associated with Professor Paul Robinson, and is
an attempt to identify a community’s deserved-punishment schedule based on that community’s
intuitions about wrongdoing and culpability. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M.
DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1995) (originating work on empirical desert). A true schedule of deontological desert may be
unknowable, so Professor Robinson has argued that “empirical desert offers the best practical
approximation of deontological desert.” See Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in
Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1110 (2011).
161. Three canonical synthetic theories have been advanced by A.M. Quinton, John Rawls,
and H.L.A. Hart. See, e.g., HART, supra note 145, at 4–5 (arguing that deterrence sets the floor of
the punishment range and that retribution sets the ceiling); PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 113–
14 (citing Quinton’s argument that consequentialism justifies punishment but that retributivism
defines it); Rawls, supra note 145, at 7–12 (advocating that rule utilitarianism justifies punishing
institutions, but that the institutions use retributivist rules).
162. For example, synthetic theories might differ on the underlying justification for using
retributivism as the punishment distribution rule, or on what rule provides the lower punishment
bound of a range. See Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 308
(2005) (contrasting the justification for the lower punishment bound under different synthetic
theories).
163. See MICHAEL T. CAHILL, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON
THEORY AND POLICY 25, 36 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) (discussing negative retributivism);
Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivism Refined—or Run Amok?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 556–57
(2010) (book review) (discussing arguments raised in LARRY ALEXANDER, KIMBERLY KESSLER

KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/27/2016 10:06 AM

CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

305

retributivism, desert sets not only the maximum bound for punishment,
but also its minimum.164
Capital-outcome concentration is maximally offensive to positive
retributivism because positive retributivism corresponds with the most
inflexible comparative-proportionality rules. The positive retributivist
believes that punishment must be proportional to desert in any given
case, and that the same scale of desert applies across offenders.165 These
two premises combine to produce the comparative-proportionality
principle: that similar offense-culpability combinations should trigger
similar punishment. Similarly culpable offenses trigger similar
punishment because society grades punishment on a shared scale of
desert.166 It is precisely the positive retributivist’s enhanced
commitment to comparative proportionality that makes capitaloutcome concentration so problematic. If two localities treat similar
offenders differently, the asymmetry means either that the capitally
active locality is punishing in excess of desert or that the capitally
sluggish locality is ignoring it. Unless local variation in fact tracks
desert or unless a synthetic theory permits different communities to
punish different offense-culpability combinations differently—
possibilities I explore in Part II.C.2—capital-outcome concentration
blatantly violates the central comparative-proportionality norm of
positive retributivism.
In part because positive retributivism represents an extraordinary
resource commitment and because it requires punishment that
promotes no social purpose, many prefer negative retributivism, in
which desert dictates upper limits on punishment.167 Negative

FERZAN, AND STEPHEN MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–9
(2009)).
164. See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1422–23 n.156 (2003) (reviewing positive
retributivism and its proponents).
165. See id.
166. The notion that just application of rules should render an independent equality rule
redundant has been the subject of debate in the equality literature. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 551 (1982) (“It is true that rules should be applied
equally, consistently, and impartially, if by ‘equally,’ ‘consistently,’ and ‘impartially’ one means
the tautological proposition that the rule should be applied in all cases to which the terms of the
rule dictate that it be applied.”).
167. See Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1173
(2013); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509,
523 (1987); cf. Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059,
1060–61 (1992) (developing a well-known negative retributivist position).
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retributivism appears as a feature of synthetic theory,168 and constrains
punishment with rules about when the state may punish, rather than
rules about when it must. Negative retributivist constraints might be
justified differently depending on the type of synthetic theory,169 but
they all impose an upper bound on punishment that corresponds to
desert.170 Theories about which offenders the state ought to select for
punishment—how the state imposes punishment within the negatively
bounded range—may be resolved by reference to some other theory,
perhaps utilitarianism.171 (The need to incorporate a non-retributive
justification accounts for the label “synthetic.”) The strongest
normative objection to capital-outcome concentration would show that
it violates a negative retributivist constraint, and I orient the balance
of Part II accordingly.
2. Retributivism and Local Muscle Memory. The question at the
heart of Part II is whether capital-outcome concentration might be
consistent with a morally legitimate source of local variation. For
capital-outcome concentration to satisfy a retributive constraint, two
conditions must obtain. First, normative theory must produce some
morally acceptable reason for locally differentiated treatment of
similar offense–offender combinations. Second, the empirical
conditions producing the local variation must approximate those that
the theory assumes.
There are at least three scenarios under which the geographic
pattern in the capital-outcome data satisfies the first condition—a
normatively acceptable source of local variation in the treatment of
similar offense–offender combinations. First, the distribution of capital
outcomes might track the distribution of desert because it reflects the
distribution of culpable homicides (the “basic desert-correspondence”
account). Second, it might track desert because local preferences can
be constitutive of desert (“modified desert correspondence”). Third,
the distribution might reflect the fact that different localities simply

168. See Christopher, supra note 162, at 292; Anthony M. Dillof, Modal Retributivism: A
Theory of Sanctions for Attempts and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 672
(2011).
169. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 60, at 140–41 (comparing retributive-constraint
justifications for theories by A.M. Quinton, A.C. Ewing, R.M. Hare, and H.L.A. Hart).
170. See Kolber, supra note 167, at 1147.
171. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 167 (1982) (“In the finetuning of punishment between the upper and lower limits of retributively deserved
punishment . . . utilitarian values should apply.”).
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punish the same levels of desert differently (“noncorrespondence”).172
Each of these accounts, however, fails to satisfy the second condition
insofar as they are excluded by the role of muscle memory. Whatever
legitimate local variation one can squeeze out of retributive theory, the
considerable influence of muscle memory means that the
circumstances that might justify such variation are not plausible
accounts of what is actually happening.
With respect to the basic desert-correspondence account and as
explained in Part II.A.1, whatever drives the geographic distribution of
death sentences and executions, it is not the distribution of sufficiently
blameworthy homicides. The geographic distribution of capital
outcomes may nonetheless be retributively unobjectionable under a
modified desert-correspondence or a noncorrespondence account.
Those two “local variation” accounts fare better than does basic desertcorrespondence. I discuss the two local variation accounts together
because each is potentially consistent with negative retributivism—if
local practice unfolds in a way that permissibly translates retributive
norms into punishment practice.
Local variation is not a phenomenon that retributivists embrace
comfortably,173 and its moral acceptability depends on the provenance
of the retributive constraint. If retributivist constraints are essentially
political principles derived from the relationship between the
individual and the state, then those constraints should not be
geographically differentiated.174 If, on the other hand, retributive
norms flow from the accumulated practice of private blaming—when
one person blames another for harm or wrongdoing—then some local
variation might be normatively acceptable.175
Local variation accounts, however, are not entirely foreign to
retributive theory. For example, local variation could fit neatly within
theories that retribution has communicative and expressive functions
that must vary with respect to the entities doing the communicating
and expressing. Under this strain of retributivist theory, punishment is
a “retributive moment” during which the state communicates
172. The noncorrespondence account still has a commitment to comparative proportionality,
but that commitment is only within the local jurisdiction. But the persistence of the
intrajurisdictional commitment is what distinguishes noncorrespondence from retributivist
accounts that sever comparative-proportionality norms entirely.
173. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal
Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 637 (2000).
174. See id. at 639.
175. See id.
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condemnation to an offender and expresses it to the public.176 If
retribution has communicative and expressive functions that are
rooted in the localities imposing the punishment, then perhaps
retribution justifies geographic variation after all. Indeed, there are a
number of retributivist subtheories that similarly provide for local
variation in sentencing practice.177
Under the modified desert–correspondence account, variation in
the exchange rate between offense-offender combinations and desert
sustains comparative proportionality across localities by keeping the
ratio of punishment to desert largely constant. Local preference is
constitutive of desert, and capitally active localities simply treat a given
offense–offender combination as more deserving of punishment. The
noncorrespondence account differs in that it does not necessitate a
constant ratio of punishment to desert. Instead, local institutional
practice need simply be consistent with some normative or democratic
theory that justifies movement within the negatively bounded
retributive limit on punishment. Equally deserving offenders may in
fact be treated differently, under certain conditions.
Whether the role of local practice is to constitute desert (modified
desert correspondence) or to legitimize differential treatment of equal
desert across localities (noncorrespondence), determining whether it
performs the hypothesized function requires scrutiny of the same
institutions. Superficially, some of the institutions that I have discussed
might seem well suited to these constituting and legitimizing functions.
The problem is that the dominance of local muscle memory excludes
the possibility that the institutions actually perform those functions.
County-level punishment activity exhibits correlated decisionmaking
and bureaucratic path dependence that frustrates the degree to which
local institutions may effectively transmit a community’s punishment
norms. Muscle memory is, in effect, the refutation of the local variation
accounts.
There is an objection to my retributivist position that treats my
muscle-memory hypothesis as largely irrelevant. The argument is that
communities express their preferences about the relationship between
desert and punishment the same way that they express preferences

176. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 155, at 910.
177. See Simons, supra note 173, at 640, 657–59. For example, alternative accounts become
necessary when dealing with international tribunals that do not speak on behalf of a dominant
community. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of
Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 653 (2012).

KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/27/2016 10:06 AM

CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

309

about many matters resolved through state action: by casting votes and
electing officials. On this view, local institutions undertake activity that
is the expression of a community’s preferences about the form and
content of any retributive event. A community’s retributive norms are,
in effect, unknowable except insofar as they are expressed through
official action.
To argue that local capital-outcome variation reflects different
community preferences because any official act is necessarily a
reflection of those same preferences, however, is to collapse penal and
democratic theory.178 A well-established retributivist tenet is that a
punishment is not appropriate simply because the state has defined
conduct as an offense.179 Retributivists obviously need an analytic
device to avoid legitimizing immoral laws, such as slavery.
Retributivism presents just punishment as something distinct from
legal punishment.180 Similarly, local deviation may be justified by
reference to community preference, but the measure of community
preference is not reducible to the decisions that its elected officials or
their appointees make.181 Whether a geographic distribution satisfies a
retributivist constraint turns on how well the punishing institutions
translate a community’s retributive norms, not on whether the
punishment practice is consistent with political theory.
If capital punishment practice is in large part local muscle
memory, the only way that outcome concentration might evade a
retributivist objection is to sever the retributivist commitment to
comparative proportionality. Such severance, however, is semantic
avoidance. Punishment within a negatively bounded sentencing range
would still have to satisfy other features of a synthetic theory. Under
such a theory, outcome concentration would likely run into a similar
comparative-proportionality constraint—except one not traceable to
retributivism so much as it is imposed pursuant to a freestanding
equality norm.182 The norm need not flow perfectly from classic penal
theory to be deeply embedded in the contemporary practice of
American punishment.
178. See Simons, supra note 173, at 643, 665.
179. See id. at 643–46.
180. This distinction traces back to the most important figures in the retributivist tradition.
For Kant, just punishment requires that punishment be both retributively and democratically
sound. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321,
350 (2002).
181. See Simons, supra note 173, at 643, 665.
182. See supra note 157, and accompanying text.
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There are plenty of regional and national institutions that are
involved in capital punishment,183 but capital punishment is a
substantially local phenomenon. Different localities practice the death
penalty in very different ways, depending on the muscle memory of
local bureaucracies and other stakeholders. The influence of such
muscle memory on the sentencing pattern is normatively problematic
because it signals that localities are violating the basic premise that
equally blameworthy offenders should be treated in the same way.
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
Notwithstanding the sizable normative problems that it presents,
the local concentration of capital outcomes activates no existing
constitutional tripwire. The Supreme Court evaluates the
constitutionality of the death penalty through various frameworks—
either wholesale or retail (in individual cases)—that are largely
insensitive to the geographic distribution of death sentences and
executions. Not every normative problem has a remedy in positive law,
so the failure to address concentration by way of federal constitutional
rule is not in and of itself noteworthy.
What is unique about capital-outcome concentration, however, is
that it goes to the core concern animating the Supreme Court’s modern
approach to the death penalty jurisprudence but to virtually none of
the technical rules implementing it. The Court has constructed a
baroque lattice of death penalty procedure to avoid undesirable
patterns, but has reserved very little room under that procedure to
consider data about the patterns themselves.
For local variation in punishment practice to have any influence
on the judicial administration of the death penalty, the Supreme Court
would have to reconsider the way it conceptualizes the meaning of
“arbitrariness,” and its relationship to other values embedded in its

183. State appellate judges are usually elected in state-wide races, as are the governors who
consider clemency petitions. See Patrick A. Langan, Crime and Punishment in the United States,
1981–1999, 33 CRIME & JUST. 123, 127 (2006). Federal judges who entertain habeas petitions are
not elected at all, but are appointed by the President, with the Senate’s advice and consent. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Sometimes the state’s postconviction representative will report to
the state attorney general, who is also elected in a state-wide race. See Note, Appointing State
Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127 HARV. L. REV. 973, 989 (2014).
At every stage of the process, federal law constrains outcomes, and the Supreme Court has
appellate power over federal issues. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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jurisprudence. Even though Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent invokes
capital-outcome concentration in its discussion of the constitutionality
of any death penalty,184 county-level concentration metrics might
ultimately be equally or better suited for quasi-retail analysis of
individual state death penalty regimes. To the extent that the
constitutional law of capital punishment reflects a fundamental
acceptance of state-to-state variation, data showing national
concentration may be less doctrinally significant than data disclosing
concentration—and therefore arbitrariness—within a particular state
jurisdiction.
In Part III, I explore the doctrinal implications of local
concentration. I devote Part III.A to explaining why the current
configuration of federal constitutional rules excludes consideration of
concentrating punishment practice. In Part III.B, I consider the
doctrinal modifications necessary to make constitutional law
nontrivially sensitive to the phenomenon.
A. Doctrinal Limitations
Capital-outcome concentration describes a geographic pattern of
death sentences and executions. Historically, pattern-based challenges
to the death penalty have shown up in three places. First, there have
been wholesale challenges to the death penalty’s constitutionality
under Eighth Amendment “proportionality” jurisprudence applicable
to all forms of punishment.185 Second, there have been retail Eighth
Amendment challenges to individual sentences based on whether the
sentence is consistent with the way a state typically punishes similarly
situated offenders.186 Third, there have been retail equal protection
challenges based on sentencing patterns that correlate with racial
variables.187 In each context, however, the existing doctrine is almost
completely insensitive to local concentration.
1. Eighth Amendment: Wholesale Consideration. Theoretically,
capital-outcome concentration could be a salient part of the wholesale
question of whether the Eighth Amendment permits the death penalty
at all. The Supreme Court conducts such macroscopic inquiry under its

184.
185.
186.
187.

See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Part III.A.3.
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Eighth
Amendment
“proportionality”
jurisprudence.188
Proportionality jurisprudence specifies categorical exclusions from
punishments, based on characteristics of the offender or the offense.
Indeed, Justice Breyer’s reference to county-level sentencing activity
in Glossip indicates that at least he and Justice Ginsburg view such
information as part of a proportionality analysis.189
Proportionality jurisprudence traces most consistently to Weems
v. United States,190 a decision establishing the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as a rule against excessive criminal penalties: “It
is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense.”191 Proportionality cases were sparse
between 1910, when the Court decided Weems,192 and 1962, when it
incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states.193
An Eighth Amendment proportionality inquiry assesses a
sentence in light of desert’s two familiar components: offense and
offender. The most developed proportionality rules involve either a
sentence of death or of life without possibility of parole (LWOP). So,
for example, certain offenses may not be capitally punished, including
rape194 and felony murder with insufficient scienter.195 Nor may certain
categories of offenders receive the death penalty, including minors196
and those who are either intellectually disabled197 or insane.198
Proportionality cases involving LWOP subdivide into similar
categories, although the Court has ultimately declared very few

188. See generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) (arguing from original meaning that
proportionality should be understood as a retributivist constraint).
189. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
191. Id. at 367.
192. Weems involved a sentence by a territorial court in the Philippines. See id. at 360.
193. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962).
194. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Coker formally announced a rule only for
the rape of an adult woman. The Supreme Court barred the death penalty as punishment for the
rape of a child in 2008. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
195. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
196. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
197. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Atkins referred to these inmates as “mentally
retarded,” but the preferred terminology is now “intellectually disabled.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S.
Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
198. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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offenses off limits199 and has strongly indicated an exemption for only
one group of offenders: juveniles.200
Starting with Trop v. Dulles,201 the Supreme Court has measured
proportionality by reference to the “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”202 The evolving-standards
test entails a two-step inquiry. First, the Court considers “objective
indicia” of penal consensus, as expressed through state legislation and
jury sentencing.203 Second, the Court considers whether, in its own
judgment, the punishment is acceptable.204 For lack of better
terminology, the inquiry has objective and subjective prongs—whether
each finding is necessary or sufficient to a proportionality violation is
not altogether clear.205 What does seem clear is that, if the Court were
to consider the wholesale constitutionality of the death penalty under
the existing proportionality inquiry, neither prong leaves room to
consider the distorted geographic distribution of death sentences and
executions.

199. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (rejecting proportionality challenge
to a three-strikes sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for felony grand theft); Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (rejecting proportionality challenge to mandatory LWOP
sentence for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983)
(declaring unconstitutional an LWOP sentence for the defendant’s seventh nonviolent felony);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (rejecting proportionality challenge to application of
Texas three-strikes law in which the defendant received a life sentence with the possibility of
parole after twelve years).
200. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012). As a formal matter, Miller only
held that mandatory LWOP sentences violated its proportionality rules. See id. at 2460.
201. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
202. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008)
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (same); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 312 (same); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (same); Ford, 477 U.S. at
406 (same).
203. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422–34 (determining objective prong by reference to
prevalence of and trends in state legislation, and by reference to the frequency of executions
imposed for the crime); Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (same); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17 (same); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–96 (1982) (analyzing state legislative commitment and jury
sentencing decisions); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592–97 (1977) (plurality opinion) (looking
to prevalence of state legislation and “sentencing decisions that juries have made”).
204. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (describing subjective inquiry as “the Court’s own
understanding and interpretation”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“We then must determine, in the
exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for juveniles.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (conducting “independent evaluation of the
issue”); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (“[I]t is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth
Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty.”).
205. See Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 303, 306 (2013).
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The objective portion of the existing proportionality inquiry does
not capture capital-outcome concentration. The prevalence of state
legislation, the trends in legislative activity, and state sentencing
intensity are the major “objective indicia” of a punishment’s
acceptability.206 Two of the three objective indicia are defined
dichotomously by state legislative status, which inherently omits
information about locally differentiated activity levels. When the
Supreme Court considers the prevalence of death penalty legislation
and constructs the trend line, it necessarily assigns a yes–no value to
each state; counties do not enact sentencing statutes.
The jury-sentencing inquiry—the third of the “objective
indicia”—has suppressed information about intrastate variation not
out of necessity, but in practice. When the Supreme Court considers
sentencing intensity under its proportionality jurisprudence, it excludes
state-level sentencing distribution. Consider the two ways the Court
usually formulates the changes it reports in a sentencing pattern:
(1) In the last X years, the number of comparable sentences has
fallen to Y;207 and
(2) In the last X years, the number of comparable sentences has
fallen to Y across Z states.208

In formulation (1), there is no consideration of distribution
whatsoever. In formulation (2), there is some nod to distribution, but
not much. There is no indication of how evenly the Y sentences are
distributed across the Z states,209 or how evenly the sentences are
distributed within any particular state. Perhaps more importantly, any
analysis limited to state capital-sentencing patterns ignores one half of

206. See supra note 203 (collecting cases deciding objective-standards inquiry by reference to
state legislative status).
207. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989), overruled by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (conducting jury-sentencing analysis by reference to nationwide
data); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 (1988) (analyzing nationwide jury-sentencing
data for offenders who committed a crime before they turned sixteen).
208. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65 (“Since Stanford, six States have executed prisoners
for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10 years, only three have done so . . . .”); Atkins,
536 U.S. at 316 (identifying the states that have executed offenders with IQ scores below seventy).
209. But see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2010) (noting state-by-state distribution
and Florida’s disproportionate share of LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses); Kennedy,
554 U.S. at 434 (noting that Louisiana is the only state to have sentenced an offender to death for
raping a child).
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the penal equation: the executions.210 Unless one believes that a state
with an enormous sentencing concentration is identical to a state with
intuitively dispersed capital outcomes, then aggregating sentencing
activity at the state level suppresses what seems to be important
information about contemporary acceptance of a particular penal
practice.
At least theoretically, the Supreme Court could incorporate
sentencing distribution as part of the inquiry under the proportionality
inquiry’s subjective prong, but it has never signaled any interest in
doing so. Nor does the distribution of sentences resemble the sort of
content the Court considers when it performs the subjective inquiry—
which is instead more normative and less data-driven. Under the
existing proportionality jurisprudence, capital-outcome concentration
is likely to be irrelevant to the constitutional status of the death penalty
writ large.
2. Eighth Amendment: Retail Consideration. If not writ large, then
what about writ small? Although capital-outcome distribution is
doctrinally insignificant under the Supreme Court’s existing wholesale
inquiry, perhaps the distribution matters at the retail level—when
considering the constitutionality of the death penalty in individual
cases. Indeed, some of the rhetoric from the opinions in the July 2
Cases—the five 1976 decisions establishing the modern constitutional
parameters for capital punishment211—suggests that the pattern of
death sentences might make such an Eighth Amendment difference.212
States have to bifurcate capital trials into guilt and punishment
phases.213 Two doctrinal priorities dominate the post-1976 Eighth
Amendment landscape: (1) the requirement that states meaningfully
narrow the group of first-degree murderers to a smaller subcategory of
death-eligible offenders, and (2) the requirement that punishmentphase juries be given the opportunity to hear and give effect to

210. But see Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433 (noting in passing the absence of executions for rapes);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (noting that the “practice [of executing intellectually disabled offenders]
is uncommon”).
211. For examples of relevant cases, see sources cited supra note 20.
212. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.46 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“A system
could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision
patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that
found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.”).
213. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 813 (1979).
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mitigating circumstances that might call for a life sentence.214 For ease
of discussion, I refer to these as the “narrowing” and
“individualization” requirements.215 Narrowing and individualization
neatly correspond to the components of desert: offense and offender.
Narrowing ensures that the offense is sufficiently grave, and
individualization ensures that the offender is sufficiently culpable.
Narrowing cannot give doctrinal form to concerns about capitaloutcome concentration. The narrowing inquiry focuses on whether
state limits on death eligibility are sufficiently substantial and
sufficiently clear.216 The outcome of a narrowing inquiry is generally
insensitive to the distribution of punishment within a jurisdiction. For
this reason, I focus more on the Supreme Court’s individualization
jurisprudence, because it has more potential as a doctrinal vehicle for
considering capital-outcome concentration.
In Woodson v. North Carolina217 and Roberts v. Louisiana218—two
of the July 2 Cases—the Supreme Court rejected mandatory capital
sentencing.219 In subsequent decisions, it has held that states must
permit a sentencer to give full consideration and effect to any
mitigating evidence.220 The rules about admitting and processing
mitigating evidence constitute the individualization requirement’s
familiar form under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.
The individualized-sentencing requirement, however, looked like
it might assume a more robust, pattern-oriented form after the July 2
214. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006).
215. Many prominent scholars use the “narrowing/individualization” nomenclature. See, e.g.,
Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1005
(2015); James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
1963−2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
216. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361–62 (1988) (“Claims of vagueness
directed at aggravating circumstances . . . characteristically assert that the challenged
provision . . . leaves [juries] and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which
was held invalid in [Furman].”); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (“To avoid this
constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”).
217. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
218. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
219. See id. at 332–34; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288–301 (plurality opinion).
220. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 262–64 (2007). Until Abdul-Kabir, the
Court had not been entirely clear as to whether the jury needed to be able to hear anything
mitigating and to give full mitigating effect to all of the evidence. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.
782, 797 (2001); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476 (1993); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328
(1989), abrogated in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 183 (1988).
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Cases. In Gregg v. Georgia221—the lead July 2 decision—the Supreme
Court sustained a nonmandatory capital-sentencing statute that,
among other things, required the Georgia Supreme Court to review
every capital sentence for consistency with “similar cases,”222 to
determine whether the penalty was “excessive or disproportionate.”223
In other words, in ending the capital punishment moratorium, the
Court seemed to anticipate that states would routinely review each
capital sentence to ensure that similarly culpable offenses were being
treated the same way.224 Such a retail inquiry is known as “comparative
proportionality” doctrine, not to be confused with either the plain-old
“proportionality” doctrine that governs the wholesale inquiry or with
the concept of “comparative proportionality” from retributivist
literature on desert.
For a period of time after the July 2 Cases, the Court flirted with
the comparative-proportionality doctrine.225 That inquiry focuses on
familiar concepts from the retributivism literature: the gravity of the
offense and culpability of the offender.226 In the language of desert,
then, comparative proportionality seeks to ensure that equally
deserving offenses are requited with equal punishment. To the extent
that the major normative harm of capital-outcome concentration is that
it violates the normative principle of comparative proportionality, the
doctrinal concept of that same name might capture those harms quite
well. Punishment of the undeserving would be flagged everywhere,
including in capitally active localities.
Even if the Supreme Court announced full-throated support of the
comparative-proportionality rules, however, there would still be
several reasons why it flounders as a doctrinal vehicle for considering
capital-outcome concentration. The first involves the distortion
associated with the procedural posture in which pattern-based
challenges are presented. A pattern-based question is necessarily
litigated in cases where a death verdict is obtained. The court can
reverse the death verdict, but it cannot impose death in other cases

221. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
222. See id. at 161, 167, 198, 204–06 (plurality opinion).
223. Id. at 167.
224. States initially complied with that expectation. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality
Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only “The Appearance of Justice”?, 87
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 154 (1996).
225. See Liebman, supra note 215, at 56–57.
226. See supra Part II.C.
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where there is a life sentence,227 where the defendant is acquitted of
capital murder, where there is no capital charge, or where the offender
is not apprehended. A court cannot guarantee that a deserving
offender in a capitally active county is actually treated the same way as
equally deserving offenders in capitally inactive ones—unless a state
supreme court is prepared to “level down” punishments by invalidating
every death sentence.228 Comparative-proportionality inquiry is
actually an ineffective vehicle for correcting under-punishment.
Second, because an idealized comparative proportionality
approach would hold desert constant and compare outcomes,
meaningful application requires an extraordinary universe of
information. The comparison requires the court to know not just the
offense and offender characteristics for cases triggering death
sentences, but those inputs for all crimes generating comparable desert.
The most judicially accessible information about desert is necessarily
in prosecuted cases that reach advanced stages of litigation—that is,
those where a death sentence is actually imposed. There is therefore a
pronounced preservation bias in favor of information about offenses
that actually trigger the death penalty, and against offenses that do not.
Such preservation bias will systematically overemphasize the
correspondence between desert and capital sentences because it
suppresses the availability of information about offending that is not
punished capitally.
The third problem is a product of the first two. In practice and as
explained above, a comparative-proportionality inquiry simply
requires that a capital sentence be in the ballpark. The inquiry tends
toward a comparison of offenders actually selected for a capital
sentence rather than a comparison of all equally culpable offenders. To
the extent that retail proportionality review does a better job of
comparing the desert of criminals subject to the same punishment than
it does comparing the punishment of criminals having the same desert,

227. I am making a general point, although it is worth noting that some states permit a trial
court to override a jury’s life sentence in a capital case. See supra text accompanying note 102.
228. The concept of needing to level down subsequent penalties to achieve equality with prior
instances of under-punishment is a particularized version of a leveling-down problem flagged in
literature on equality. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 693, 696 (2000) (“Second, sometimes equality seems to demand ‘leveling down,’ to no one’s
benefit. If the resources of two groups or classes are to be equalized, then apparently we satisfy
equality if we take resources away from the more fortunate group, even if this does not benefit
the less fortunate.”).
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there is certainly no mechanism to account for the additional layer of
geographic variation in the latter.
Fourth, comparative-proportionality inquiry is incapable of
capturing capital-outcome concentration because it involves only half
of a capital-outcome pattern: the death sentence. Even though the
geographic distribution of executions poses substantial problems for a
retributively constrained death penalty, irregular patterns are not
picked up by the comparative-proportionality inquiry, which involves
death sentences and is performed by a court in the direct-review chain.
By definition, that review happens before a state officer signs a death
warrant, and it is therefore incapable of facilitating an apples-to-apples
comparison involving the distribution of executions.
Those four problems, however, are secondary to a much more
immediate one: the Supreme Court has eliminated any ongoing
commitment to serious comparative-proportionality inquiry. The
Court has never been interested in conducting comparativeproportionality inquiry itself,229 but it did briefly entertain the idea that
it would require state appellate courts to perform that function. As
mentioned above, Gregg was the lead July 2 Case, and it placed
considerable emphasis on the fact that the Georgia appellate process
would be facilitating comparative-proportionality review.230 In other
words, one of the reasons the Court seemed to suggest for ending the
moratorium on the death penalty was that it anticipated states would
be reviewing each capital sentence to ensure that similar offenders
were being treated the same way.
The Supreme Court, however, has extinguished the idea that the
Constitution might require even that watered-down version of
comparative-proportionality review. In Pulley v. Harris,231 the Court
conceded the emphasis on comparative-proportionality review in the
July 2 Cases, but held that the emphasis did not mean that states had
to provide for it.232 Having excluded comparative proportionality from
the core of the July 2 regime, the Court effectively eliminated perhaps
the most obvious mechanism for considering the effect of local

229.
230.
231.
232.

See Liebman, supra note 215, at 103.
See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
See id. at 44–45.
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sentencing variation. After Pulley, most states abandoned
comparative-proportionality review entirely.233
Having allowed the comparative-proportionality experiment to
run its course, the Supreme Court settled on a very process-oriented
mechanism for retail inquiry; courts must simply ensure that juries hear
and be capable of acting on mitigating evidence.234 The result is that,
like wholesale inquiry, retail Eighth Amendment determinations are
insensitive to capital-outcome concentration. If the Eighth
Amendment is to be a vehicle for pattern-based challenges to the death
penalty, then the Court will have to fundamentally transform either its
wholesale or retail jurisprudence.
3. Equal Protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is theoretically capable of supporting a
pattern-based challenge to capital punishment. To the extent that the
capital-outcome intensity of different jurisdictions—and therefore the
overall distribution—correlates with racial variables, then a rule rooted
in the Equal Protection Clause could capture some of the normative
concerns that the distribution presents. As it did with comparativeproportionality doctrine, however, the Supreme Court has shut down
any pattern-based attempt to prove an equal protection violation in a
particular case.235
The Equal Protection Clause protects persons from differentiated
treatment,236 and the scrutiny is based on the differentiating attribute.
If the attribute relates to race or national origin, for example, the action
must withstand strict scrutiny.237 If it relates to sex, it must withstand
intermediate scrutiny.238 If it relates to a “non-suspect” classification,
then it must simply withstand rational basis review.239 The Supreme
Court has recognized equal protection challenges to death sentences.
A capital sentence, for example, violates Batson v. Kentucky240 if the
prosecution uses race to determine peremptory strikes on jurors.241

233. See Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and
Claims of Fairness (with Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 791–92 (2004).
234. See supra note 220.
235. See infra notes 242–51 and accompanying text.
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
237. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
238. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
239. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993).
240. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
241. See id. at 82, 100.
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In McCleskey v. Kemp,242 however, the Supreme Court
categorically foreclosed the use of pattern-based evidence to prove an
equal protection violation.243 In McCleskey, a Georgia inmate
presented a sprawling study of the connection between race and capital
sentencing in that state. McCleskey was a young black man from
Fulton County, Georgia who had killed a white police officer during a
robbery. McCleskey offered the “Baldus Study”—named after
Professor David Baldus, the study’s lead author—as evidence of the
equal protection violation.244 The Baldus Study used then-cutting-edge
regression analysis to establish that killing white victims was 4.3 times
as likely to result in a death sentence as was killing black victims, and
that black defendants were capitally punished 1.1 times as frequently
as white ones.245
Justice Powell was the swing vote in McCleskey, and became
convinced, as the litigation progressed, both that the Baldus Study was
methodologically sound and that he did not want to go down the
slippery slope of permitting statistical evidence alone to sustain
litigation under the Equal Protection Clause.246 The result of Justice
Powell’s conclusions was the controlling opinion in McCleskey, in
which he conceded the statistical correlations presented in the Baldus
Study, but argued that they were insufficient to prove a constitutional
violation because “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system.”247
McCleskey is more than a touch controversial, with its detractors
lumping it with anticanon decisions like Korematsu v. United States,248
Plessy v. Ferguson,249 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.250 There is a

242. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
243. See id. at 291–99.
244. See id. at 286–87.
245. See id. at 287.
246. See id. at 314–19.
247. Id. at 312. This portion of McCleskey was actually discussing an Eighth Amendment
violation.
248. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Randall L. Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388,
1389 (1988) (comparing McCleskey with Korematsu).
249. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Kennedy, supra note 248, at 1389
(comparing McCleskey with Plessy).
250. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using
Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721, 733 (2003) (comparing
McCleskey with Dred Scott).
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mountainous literature attacking what many perceived as the casual
acceptance of differentiated racial impact.251 Without wading into that
literature’s thicket, suffice it to say that McCleskey eliminated the
possibility that pattern-based evidence could be used to show an equal
protection violation.
The insufficiency of pattern-based evidence short-circuits the use
of the Equal Protection Clause to litigate the consequences of capitaloutcome concentration in two ways. First, to the extent that local
variation in capital practice correlates with race—and there are
considerable data that it does—McCleskey eliminates a means for
attacking that variation indirectly. Second, McCleskey also signals the
impossibility of a direct attack on a classification based on geographic
variables. Race is a protected status; geography is not. If a court will
not permit pattern-based evidence to sustain a racial classification
subject to strict scrutiny, then pattern-based evidence is useless as a
means of challenging a geographic classification subject to rational
basis review.
B. Arbitrariness and Doctrinal Modification
There is a touch of irony in the existing doctrinal status of capitaloutcome distribution. Impermissible patterns are the source of concern
inspiring equal protection doctrine generally and modern Eighth
Amendment restrictions on capital punishment specifically. Although
pattern-oriented injustice might be an animating legal purpose, it is not
part of the existing doctrinal math in death penalty cases. If the
Supreme Court were to refine its death penalty jurisprudence in light
of capital-outcome concentration, then what might it change? The
answer, I submit, has to do with the way the Court defines
“arbitrariness” and how it specifies that concept’s relationship to other
Eighth Amendment values. A definitional revision might substantially

251. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty Before and After
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 46–47 (2007); David C. Baldus, George
Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination
in Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 364–76 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black,
97 YALE L.J. 420, 443 (1988); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1016−17 (1988).
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affect quasi-retail inquiry into the constitutionality of death penalty
practice within a particular state.252
1. Defining Arbitrariness. American death penalty decisions are
replete with references to the evils of “arbitrariness.”253 Furman, the
July 2 Cases, and decades of subsequent Supreme Court opinions have
generally defined a nonarbitrary pattern as one in which there is some
correlation between desert and capital events.254 That correlation
negates arbitrariness, without respect to the influence of other
variables. Equating arbitrariness only with randomness is restrictive in
that such a definition excludes patterns that are too sensitive to
normatively irrelevant attributes of the offense, offender, or
proceedings. In other words, an arbitrary capital pattern might actually
arise in two ways: (1) when a sentencing pattern is insufficiently
sensitive to a variable that should differentiate outcomes
(“randomness”), or (2) when it is too sensitive to a variable that should
not (“irrelevant sensitivity”).255 The Court operates with a definition of
arbitrariness that embraces the first attribute, but not the second; a
refined arbitrariness rule would nudge the definition from the core to
the frontier.

252. For example, in McCleskey, the Supreme Court noted that the statistical proof offered
as evidence of discrimination “would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the
victim was white and the defendant is black.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
253. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992) (“[O]ur Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence . . . protect[s] against arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death sentence.”);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment
it [must try to avoid] the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.”); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[D]iscretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is evidence that the provision of the
English Bill of Rights of 1689 [was aimed] to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a
severe nature . . . .”); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Rather than kill an arbitrary handful
of criminals each year, the States will confine them in prison.”).
254. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308 (“Because McCleskey’s sentence was imposed under
Georgia sentencing procedures that focus [on offense and offender attributes], we lawfully may
presume that McCleskey’s death sentence was not wantonly and freakishly imposed . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Furman, 408 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the rate of
infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals
who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.”).
255. This view of arbitrariness is consistent with the way some theorists have defined
“equality.” See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1229
(1997) (“By this definition, unjust treatment always occurs when a person is not treated in
accordance with the net effect of all the relevant criteria—for instance, when an irrelevant
criterion is used to determine that person’s treatment.”).
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When courts say that capital-sentencing patterns are “arbitrary”
in the restrictive sense, they mean that the condemned are selected
randomly from a qualified group. This type of arbitrariness was, for
example, what troubled Justice White in his extraordinarily influential
Furman concurrence—the idea that states capitally sentenced and
executed death-qualified offenders too infrequently.256 The idea of
arbitrariness as infrequency is the reason why sentencing patterns
punctuated with only occasional executions were so often described as
“freakish.”257 Laboring under a randomness-only definition, the
Supreme Court has birthed a jurisprudence occupied with devices
necessary to ensure that, ceteris paribus, more deserving offenders are
more likely to be capitally sentenced and executed.258
As explained above, the frontier definition of arbitrariness also
covers irrelevant sensitivity. Irrelevant sensitivity describes a
sentencing pattern that is not arbitrary in the sense that it is random or
otherwise unpredictable. Instead, the pattern is influenced by variables
that should be inconsequential insofar as they are unrelated to desert
or some other legitimate sentencing objective.259 For example, if a
sentencing pattern is a function of a defendant’s race or national origin
and if arbitrary means random, then describing the pattern as
“arbitrary” is misleading. There is nothing random about the pattern—
offenders selected for capital sentences and executions are simply
selected on the basis of an irrelevant variable.
For both wholesale and retail inquiries under the Eighth
Amendment, the law’s ability to capture the normative issues
embedded in capital-outcome concentration turns on the willingness of
the Court to travel from the definitional core to the frontier. The
concern that locality impermissibly influences the punishment pattern
is fundamentally an objection rooted in irrelevant sensitivity.260

256. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). See generally Liebman, supra note
215, at 10 (describing modern death penalty doctrine as vacillating between the views of Justices
Stewart and White).
257. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (“Our capital punishment doctrine is
rooted in the principle that ‘[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be . . . wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed.’” (citations omitted) (alterations in original)). An
infrequently imposed punishment is not necessarily arbitrary, but the pattern of executions in the
United States is not entirely explained by selectivity. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 125, at
169−75 (explaining that infrequency of death sentencing is not due to selectivity).
258. See supra Part III.A.2.
259. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 125, at 175−82.
260. See id. at 175.
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2. Arbitrariness in Wholesale Inquiry. As of now, there is little
room for data about capital-outcome concentration in wholesale
inquiry. The evolving-standards-of-decency approach to Eighth
Amendment questions centers on objective indicia of penal
acceptance, but those indicia are merely indicators of infrequency—
not of distribution. When the Supreme Court looks at the objective
indicia, it separates the universe into retention states and abolition
states,261 it counts the number in each category,262 and it sometimes
notes the direction of change.263 So as not to elevate form over function,
it may consider how frequently the pertinent sentence is actually
imposed, and occasionally it will mention how many states are
responsible for those sentences.264 That information does not capture
the degree to which punishment is concentrated in particular localities
within states. The overarching question is whether the omitted
information should be constitutionally significant—that is, whether
different punishment concentration actually corresponds to different
Eighth Amendment “standards of decency.”
There are two reasons why it might. First, assuming that
“consensus” is the concept that the data approximate, there is probably
less consensus around an equally frequent punishment that is
concentrated in fewer localities. In the most extreme conceivable
distribution, where all sentencing activity is concentrated in a single
locality (“perfect concentration”), it seems fair to say that punishment
enjoys less consensus than if it were more evenly distributed across
localities. Assuming that a consensus value falls as it approaches
perfect concentration, the doctrinal significance of the metrics
developed in Part I becomes clearer. To the extent that those metrics
show that the distribution of capital punishment is moving toward the
extreme end of the concentration spectrum, wholesale inquiry
reporting state-wide data overstates consensus.

261. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (engaging in classification); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314−15 (2002) (same); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 790–91 (1982)
(same). See generally Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges
Consensus (and How to Do It Better), 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2397, 2407–09 (2014) (discussing
categorization and counting of retentionist and abolitionist states).
262. For examples of cases following categorization with counting, see supra note 261.
263. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”); see also Smith et al., supra note 261,
at 2410−11 (discussing “the Direction of Legislative Change”).
264. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. See generally Smith et al., supra note 261,
at 2411−14 (discussing number of sentences imposed and executions).
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Second, one might relax the assumption that the data are
supposed to be measuring national consensus at all, because such
consensus may be only one facet of a standards-of-decency inquiry.
Objective indicia measure frequency—but why? On the one hand,
frequency might matter because it strongly indicates consensus.265 On
the other hand, low frequency also corresponds to another punishment
attribute: arbitrariness.266 Put differently, the Supreme Court looks to
objective indicia of sentence frequency because low frequency suggests
that, when the sentence is imposed, it is still being imposed arbitrarily.
If infrequency is merely a proxy for arbitrariness, then it is perfectly
reasonable to consider other evidence of the underlying
phenomenon—such as the local concentration of capital punishment.
Moreover, if the Supreme Court were unwilling to consider
punishment concentration as an objective index of evolving decency,
there remains room for concentration values in the subjective part of
the doctrinal calculus. The Court, however, has been wary of having
the subjective prong do any independent work, instead resolving it in
whatever way reinforces the objective inquiry.267 Increasing the bite of
the subjective prong has consequences for the Court’s credibility and
legitimacy,268 and it would likely feel compelled to articulate a
persuasive rationale limiting that bite to the death penalty context.
Taking a step back, however, capital-outcome concentration
metrics have nontrivial appeal as a means of breaking a logjam in
wholesale Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. All sorts of public-choice
phenomena account for the legislative status of capital punishment,269
and sentencing data grouped by state obscure substantial information
about how the punishment is practiced within each statewide political
unit.270 If the Supreme Court’s preference is for objective information
that speaks to a normatively significant phenomenon, then there is no
reason why that universe of data need indicate only the frequency and
state-level distribution of punishment. The Court might care about the
local concentration of capital outcomes either because such
information actually measures consensus or because it goes to the
conceptually distinct question of arbitrariness.
265. See Smith et al., supra note 261, at 2411−14.
266. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
267. See Farrell, supra note 205, at 306.
268. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 170 (2003).
269. See Smith et al., supra note 261, at 2419−23.
270. See id. at 2432.

Quasi-Neutral

Principles

and

KOVARSKY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/27/2016 10:06 AM

CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

327

3. Arbitrariness in Retail Inquiry. The restrictive definition of
arbitrariness also limits retail Eighth Amendment inquiry. Trial
procedures are subject to challenge only to the extent that they tend to
produce arbitrary sentencing patterns,271 and a sentencing pattern is
currently designated as arbitrary only if desert does not correlate with
death sentences.272 As with arbitrariness and wholesale inquiry, moving
to the definitional frontier would make doctrinal room for capitaloutcome concentration. Local concentration would be particularly
valuable information for a quasi-retail inquiry into the constitutionality
of a state’s capital punishment system.
For anyone critical of how retail Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence defines arbitrariness, there is a familiar culprit:
McCleskey.273 Although most focus on McCleskey’s equal protection
holding, it also walled the definition of Eighth Amendment
arbitrariness inside the frontier. In much the same way that it rejected
a correlation between outcomes and race as insufficient to prove an
equal protection violation, McCleskey also considered that correlation
insufficient to show Eighth Amendment arbitrariness.274 The Court
explained that an arbitrary pattern was something other than one
where similarly situated defendants were treated differently: “Absent
a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a
constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who
may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.”275 The
Court then held that, as long as capital sentences had some correlation
with desert, a pattern could not be arbitrary: “Because . . . sentencing
procedures . . . focus discretion ‘on the particularized nature of the
crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual
defendant,’ we lawfully may presume that McCleskey’s death sentence
was not ‘wantonly and freakishly imposed’ . . . under the Eighth
Amendment.”276
McCleskey, however, is equal parts impediment and opportunity.
Because the opinion took as a premise that the discretion yielding the
sentencing pattern was uncorrelated, it leaves the Eighth Amendment

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra notes 231−34 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.1.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
See id. at 306−13.
Id. at 306−07.
Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 206–07 (1976)).
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door to the definitional frontier cracked. A pattern of jury decisions
was not, McCleskey explained, state “policy”; instead, it was the
combined effect of “the decisions of hundreds of juries that are unique
in their composition.”277 For similar reasons, McCleskey rejected a
pattern-based argument rooted in prosecutorial discretion: “Since
decisions whether to prosecute and what to charge necessarily are
individualized . . . , coordination among district attorney offices across
a State would be relatively meaningless. Thus, any inference from
statewide statistics to a prosecutorial ‘policy’ is of doubtful
relevance.”278
Capital-process concentration undermines this assumption in at
least two respects. First, the data suggest that decisions by prosecutors
within an office and by local juries are not “individualized”; they
actually correlate with the same underlying phenomena, and with each
other.279 Second, the data do not show the arbitrariness of statewide
policy, but the arbitrariness that results from localities having very
difficult muscle memory.280 McCleskey, therefore, may not entirely
foreclose the use of pattern-based evidence to show irrelevant
sensitivity.
One reason why a retail solution might be appealing to the
Supreme Court is that the slope between capital and noncapital
doctrine is not all that slippery. The retail rule against arbitrary
sentencing is a rule against arbitrary capital sentencing extracted from
Furman and the July 2 Cases. Because the rule derives from the death
penalty-specific features of Eighth Amendment doctrine, there is less
risk that adjusting the definition of arbitrariness under these rules
would necessitate a similar adjustment for noncapital cases.281
Of course, there are some challenges if the Supreme Court wants
to operate on the definitional frontier. Recognizing irrelevantsensitivity challenges would require some threshold of nontriviality;
otherwise, the nonarbitrariness rule would simply end capital
punishment. Setting the threshold higher would permit the states that

277. Id. at 295 n.15.
278. Id. at 295−96, 295 n.15. (emphasis added).
279. See supra Part II.C.2.
280. The McCleskey Court was stating its assumptions under its equal protection analysis,
even though those assumptions were logically applicable to its Eighth Amendment analysis. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.15.
281. The Supreme Court has begun to venture gingerly into noncapital territory with its
juvenile LWOP cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (imposing
individualization requirement for LWOP sentences).
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have sufficient geographic dispersion to continue to impose death
sentences and execute offenders without disruption. In those states
where capital outcomes are extraordinarily concentrated, by contrast,
defendants from capitally active localities would have a stronger claim
that their capital sentence was “arbitrary and freakish.”
Moreover, the inquiry that would naturally result from irrelevantsensitivity challenges is best described as quasi-retail. If the
problematic variable is location, there is a strong chance that desert
correlates heavily with capital sentences in some localities and not
others. In fact, there will almost certainly be localities where deserving
offenders are simply not capitally punished. Recognition of an
arbitrary pattern, then, will necessarily affect a broad category of cases.
The result for many localities may be a leveling down of capital
outcomes so as to conform the state jurisdiction to the desert
parameters of the less active counties. In some state jurisdictions,
however, the only logical result might be to discontinue capital
sentencing and executions entirely. The unavoidability of such quasiwholesale effects might be one reason why the Supreme Court
disfavored an irrelevant-sensitivity rule to begin with.282
*

*

*

Broadening the definition of arbitrariness to include irrelevant
sensitivity is a doctrinal move that would obviously invite line-drawing
problems about how much influence is too much, as well as war-ofexpert-style debates about the soundness of statistical technique. At
the same time, the broader definition fits common intuitions about how
death sentencing ought to work. Expected punishment should not be
substantially affected because someone is tall, or fat, or rich, or black,
or blonde, or gay, or wealthy—or residing in the wrong county.
Expanding the definition of arbitrariness to include the impermissible
influence of irrelevant variables is the key doctrinal move in creating
space for capital-outcome concentration data in Eighth Amendment
inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The data on capital outcomes disclose substantial concentration—
local pockets of sustained capital activity dotting a much larger map of

282. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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abstention—both nationally and within capitally active states. There is
no benign cause for the concentration of capital outcomes in Harris
County, Caddo Parish, Los Angeles, or Oklahoma City. The best way
to explain concentration is by reference to the tendency of certain
discretionary decisions to correlate with one another.
In light of such correlated and path-dependent decisionmaking,
capital-outcome concentration reflects severe violations of the basic
punishment norm that similarly blameworthy offenders be treated
equally. Whether that normative problem ultimately represents
something constitutionally significant may turn on the Supreme
Court’s post-Glossip appetite for reworking its Eighth Amendment
definition of arbitrariness.

